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in Haiti
The Haitian Creole Summer
Institute focuses on Haiti through an
interdisciplinary approach. It is
designed for graduate and under
graduate students, teachers, and the
general public. The Institute offers
the opportunity to develop knowl
edge of Haitian Creole structure,
gain a better understanding of the
social, historical and political devel
opment of Haitian society, and dis
cover various aspects of the Haitian
culture. This year's program includes
an optional two-week tour of Haiti.
Iron Market, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
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E D I T O R

n August 1999, Jaim e Garzon, a popular political satirist, was gunned down on his way to
the Bogota radio station where he worked. T he m u rd er sparked an outpouring of
protests and m ourning in Colom bia and received extensive coverage in the international
press. Regrettably, however, the m u rd er o f a journalist is an all too com m on occurrence
in m uch of Latin America. Scores o f less famous reporters, photographers and editors in
the region have lost their lives in the past decade as a direct result o f their work, without
receiving the same public attention.
This issue o f Hemisphere focuses on journalism in Latin America, in both its positive and nega
tive aspects. In his article about anti-press violence in the region, Silvio Waisbord argues that such
attacks are not isolated events, but rath er the product of societies with legacies of hum an rights
abuses and weak civil institutions. H e uses the m u rd er o f A rgentine photojournalist Jose Luis
Cabezas as a case in point. A nother journalist who died violently in A rgentina, Rodolfo Walsh, is
the subject of an article by Jose Luis Benavides. The article celebrates the lifework o f a m an rec
ognized as a pioneer in the m ovem ent toward socially responsible journalism . C happell Lawson
also emphasizes a lessening o f state control over the m edia in his article about the growth of inde
p en d e n t journalism in Mexico. Finally, Laurie Goering, a re p o rter with The Chicago Tribune,
shares h er (often hum orous) experiences working as a correspondent in Brazil.
O th er topics covered in this issue include the ongoing legal proceedings against General
Augusto Pinochet. Gregory Weeks provides a sum m ary of the case and its im plications for
Chilean politics, as well as o th er dictators past and present. Two articles look at trade relations
between the countries o f the W estern H em isphere and Europe, a timely issue given the recent
protests against globalization in many parts of the world. Jan e t C hernela’s piece on the changing
econom ic landscape of Manaus ties into this them e by studying the shifting role of the
Am azonian rainforest in the global economy.
A double book review by Kathleen M artin focuses on R igoberta M enchu, the Nobel Prizewinning indigenous activist who found herself at the center o f controversy last year. M artin
reviews M enchu’s own book as well as a critical account o f h er story by anthropologist David Stoll.
Finally, the photo essay in this issue features a series of poignant images from the m ining towns
of Bolivia, m any of which were virtually abandoned after a 1985 decree closed the state-owned tin
mines. T he pictures retu rn to the them e of globalization and the im pact stream lined econom ic
policies can have on specific industries and populations. Yet, they also reveal the tenacity of the
displaced m ine workers and the birth of private enterprises in many towns.
As always, we welcome your com m ents about Hemisphere and look forw ard to bringing you our
next issue, whose focus will be racial and ethnic identity in Latin Am erica and the Caribbean.

I

E duardo A. G am arra
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Stranger Than Fiction
Laurie Goering

ften, it seems, cover
ing Brazil comes
down to a test of sta
mina. Take the forest
fires that roared
through Brazil’s
no rth ern Roraima state last year,
blackening rainforest and parts of the
country’s main Yanomami Indian
reserve.
For the better part of a week I and
other journalists made forays into the
fire zone by rental car and small
plane on the days when the smoke
wasn’t too thick. We interviewed fire
fighters, local victims and Indian
agency officials. We scorched our
shoes and drank warm soft drinks in
the stifling heat.
Finally, it came time to leave for
other stories. The problem was, we
couldn’t.
Thick smoke that made a joke of
the capital’s nam e—Boa Vista, or
“Good View”—had downed all flights
for days. With each cancellation, the
lines at the airport grew.
Finally, desperate, several of us
climbed aboard the only transporta
tion out of town, a bus to Manaus
arranged by the airlines. Only 13
hours, on “mosdy” paved roads, the
ticketing agent promised. Once
there, we’d have priority status for
flights out of the Amazon.
We got the last seats on the bus,
next to the toilet, which quit function
ing less than an hour into the “flight.”
During frequent rest stops the driver
lurched back to visit with us, whiskey
botde in hand. At river crossings, fer
ries failed to appear. A live sex act
took place in the seat in front of us.

Laurie Goering is the South America
correspondent for The Chicago Tribune.
4
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Writing about Brazil—and the rest of Latin America—has its
oivn set of pitfalls, and in four years of living in Brazil I’ve found
most of them.
Finally, 14 hours later and with
m idnight approaching, we pulled
into Manaus, covered head to toe in
thick red dust.
“Let me guess,” jo k ed the airline
agent at the counter. “Boa Vista?”
Writing about Brazil—and the rest
of Latin America—has its own set of
pitfalls, and in four years o f living in
Brazil I’ve found most of them.
This country, for instance, does
no t have the kind of com prehensive
open records laws journalists rou
tinely depend on in the U nited
States. Getting governm ent docu
m ents is mostly a test of patience
and charm , no t a m atter o f submit
ting Freedom of Inform ation Act
requests.
I once tried to get a set of proper
ty records at a governm ent office in
the northeastern city of Fortaleza, as
part of an investigative series. I was
m et with suspicion by the woman
behind the counter.
O f course I couldn’t see the docu
m ents—not that she had them any
way, she said. Why did I need them?
W hat was my motive? The fact that I
was a journalist wasn’t good enough.
For a few hours I sat with h er and
chatted about h er job, h er kids, my
job, Chicago, the w eather and the
latest soccer results. She served me
a bowl of hom em ade candied
cashew fruit.
Eventually, after a bit o f looking,
she found the records and let me
see them . She h a d n ’t given them to
me, she emphasized, and I couldn’t

photocopy them or record them in
any other way.
We chatted a while longer, as I
glanced nonchalantly through the
documents. In time, she decided
that perhaps I could copy them after
all, ju st as long as I prom ised never
to use h er nam e in connection with
my story. I did, and we both left sat
isfied.
Encounters with Brazil’s notorious
bureaucracy d o n ’t always go so
smoothly. Last year, it took me near
ly a year to renew my working visa,
including a standoff with a clerk who
opined that my letter of application
wasn’t detailed enough and insisted
my visa wasn’t ready, eight m onths
after it had been granted. Along the
way the customs authority threatened
to deport my furniture and my cat.
Eventually I got the visa—one day
after Veja, Brazil’s leading news
magazine, ran a story about my
plight. ‘You’re famous,” said the
chief of the visa section, when I
walked into the office. He gave me a
big hug and the desk clerk gave me
my visa—after insisting that I make a
new photocopy of a key docum ent,
as the current one was 23% too
large.
Magical realism is alive and well in
Brazil. Sometimes the smaller issues
of journalism in Latin America, how
ever, are ju st as thorny. Take the
term “Latin America” itself.
Brazilians, of Portuguese rather than
Spanish heritage, take offense some
times at being term ed part of “Latin”
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Covering the news in Brazil

America. The problem is, there is no
o th er easy way to describe the
region. Calling som ething an issue
in “Latin America and Brazil” is awk
ward and confusing for readers, par
ticularly when journalists d o n ’t have
room repeatedly to explain Brazil’s
rather different history to an audi
ence that still thinks that Spanish is
the only language spoken between
the Rio G rande and Antarctica.
Describing Indians is for me anoth
er vexing problem . Newspapers in
the U nited States try to use the politi
cally correct term “native Americans”
when possible to describe Indians in
this country. W hat then to call
Brazil’s natives? Surely they too are
native Americans, but how do I stop
readers from picturing the Sioux in
Amazonia? I still haven’t come up
with a good alternative, despite
hours of pondering.
As a non-speaker of Portuguese
when I arrived in Brazil, I’ve had my
m om ents with the language as well.
I once referred to a source—let’s call
him Joao Oliveira Neto—as Mr. Neto
in second reference. Neto actually
means “the third.” 1 also early in my
tenure narrowly avoided translating
the Zona de Mata, near the coast of
Pernam buco state, as the Zone of
Death. It is, of course, the Forest
Zone.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty fac
ing a correspondent in Latin
America, however, is simply m aking
stories from the region interesting to
the readers back home.
I adm it that before I moved to Rio
de Janeiro, I rarely read a story from
the region, except for tales from the
Amazon, and I had to look at a map
to find Rio. I try to keep that in
m ind as I write for others, many of
whom share my shortcomings.

What is increasingly clear to me is
that when American journalists here
focus on writing straightforward
news stories, about elections in
Venezuela or lack of funding for
environm ental protection in Brazil,
not many readers come along for the
ride.
W hen we spin tales, however, we
pull in readers who wouldn’t other
wise pay attention. Who could put
down a story, for instance, not about
Venezuela’s elections but about a
charismatic form er coup leader who
thinks him self part Jesus Christ and
part Simon Bolivar and rises to
power democratically, quoting Walt
W hitman in his inauguration speech?
O r how about the Roman Catholic
priest/p o p star who was voted
Brazil’s sexiest m an—and ju st hap
pens to be leading one of the most
successful revivals of the Roman
Catholic Church in the region?
Magic realism is alive and well in
Latin America, and it is these kinds
of tales that bring the region to life
for readers who otherwise have little
interest in this part of the world.
Brazil’s recent economic crisis has
pointed to another potential pitfall
of reporting here—journalists’ ability
to influence, as well as simply cover,
the news.
With investors scrutinizing Brazil, a
foreign news agency in Rio de
Janeiro released a photo showing
Brazilians jam m ed in long lines out
side the banks. In Brazil, everyone
knows that such lines are normal,
but in the U nited States the photo
was taken as evidence of a ru n on the
banks—and nearly produced one
here as worried foreign investors
fled, the currency plunged and
depositors ran to switch their savings
into dollars.

The Brazilian m edia in turn
prom pted their own ru n on the
banks by repeating rum ors—in large
front-page headlines— that President
Fernando H enrique Cardoso was
planning to freeze bank accounts,
despite his vehem ent denials.
Accounts were never frozen, and cus
tomers trooped back to redeposit
their money when the scare was over.
I’ve seen intentional m edia abuses
as well. I once visited a group of
Guarani Indians who had seized what
they considered ancestral land from
a local farmer. A Brazilian television
news program a few days earlier had
shown one of the Guarani holding a
gun to the television rep o rter’s head.
I asked the Indians why they’d
threatened the reporter. “Oh, he
begged us to do that. He said it
would make good television,” one of
the Indian leaders said. I winced for
my profession.
I myself, however, have also been
accused of plotting. While covering
the fires near Boa Vista, I and other
foreign reporters happened to see a
news analysis segm ent by a religious
com m entator on local television.
Amazonia, he squawked with indig
nation, was the victim of a plot.
Spies and foreign operatives, posing
as foreign journalists, were rushing
to town not to write about the blaz
ing fires but to try to lay the ground
work for a foreign takeover of the
Amazon, he said.
By suggesting Brazil is incapable of
caring for the world's largest rainfor
est, he continued, the spies were cre
ating the justification for an invasion.
Those of us gathered around the
television looked at each other in
amazement. An international plot?
We h a d n ’t even been able to orga
nize a flight out of Boa Vista yet. ■
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Autumn of the General
Gregory Weeks

A

lthough G eneral
already showing signs of strain; the
Augusto P inochet
Pinochet arrest m ade unity even
han d ed power back
m ore problem atic and com plicated
to civilians in 1990
F rei’s policy choices.
after nearly 17 years
S upporting the arrest would
of dictatorship, he
antagonize the military, and espe
rem ains a polarizing force in cially
Chile.the army. P inochet is revered
His continued presence as com m an
within its ranks, and the new com 
d er in chief o f the army proved
m an d er in chief, G eneral Ricardo
problem atic for establishing civilian
Izurieta, would have been forced to
suprem acy over the arm ed forces.
react. T hroughout the 1990s, the
O nce he retired from the army in
army resorted to shows o f force,
M arch 1998, he was entitled u n d er
veiled threats and intense m edia
the m ilitary-penned 1980 constitu
campaigns to protest governm ent
tion to becom e a senator for life,
policies it believed were contrary to
thus ensuring his active presence in
its interests. Consequently, the
politics until his death. W hen
threat o f a new crisis was very real.
Pinochet was arrested in L ondon on
It would necessarily politicize
O ctober 16, 1998 on the orders of
Izurieta, whom the governm ent
Spanish ju d g e Baltasar Garzon, the
considers a m ore “professional” offi
Chilean governm ent was dealing
cer and who refrained from the
not with an aged and discredited
constant political pronouncem ents
dictator, but a senator who contin
that characterized Pinochet.
ued to com m and considerable sup
However, Izurieta also faced consid
p o rt from the Chilean right.
erable pressure from the officer
corps to retain a hard line and to
D o m e s t ic P o l it ic s
protect the com m ander in chief
P in o ch et’s case presented the
benemento, a title granted P inochet
adm inistration o f then President
before he retired that has no legal
E duardo Frei with a difficult situa
basis o th er than to dem onstrate his
tion. Frei is a Christian Dem ocrat
elevated status.
(as was his predecessor, Patricio
The army did n o t hesitate to
Aylwin) but p art o f the ruling party
m ake its concerns known to the
coalition known as the
governm ent. The day after the
C oncertacion, which includes the
arrest, it issued a statem ent express
Socialist Party and the Party for
ing its "perm anent support and soli
Democracy. Both are left-leaning
darity" with Pinochet. Izurieta m et
parties th at have clam ored for m ore
several times with the com m anders
active efforts to bring to trial those
in chief o f the o th er branches of
m ilitary officers who com m itted
the military, and all watched the
hum an rights abuses u n d er the mili
governm ent closely. T here was little
tary regim e. T he coalition was
im m ediate reason for com plaint:
President Frei, form er President
Aylwin, Foreign M inister Jose
Gregory Weeks is a lecturer in the
Miguel Insulza and the A rchbishop
Department of Political Science at San
of Santiago consistently dem anded
Diego State University.
P inochet’s release. Genaro
6
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Arriagada, a p ro m in en t Christian
Dem ocrat, wrote in an editorial that
a "peaceful transition from dictator
ship to dem ocracy is not a judicial
problem . Rather, politics m ust dis
crim inate am ong the differing and
sometimes antagonistic objectives
th at society dem ands." Even Raul
Rettig, the form er head o f a com 
mission that investigated and pub
lished the details of hum an rights
abuses, stated that the issue should
be left to Chile to resolve. In o ther
words, foreign judicial proceedings
would upset the delicate political
balance so carefully constructed
since 1990.
The governm ent was also acutely
aware that popular su p p o rt for
Pinochet was far from negligible.
Polls dem onstrated that nearly 40%
of the population considered them 
selves P inochet supporters, while
31% opposed him and 29% either
d id n ’t know o r d id n ’t respond.
Despite the fact that a significant
m inority o f Chileans opposed the
arrest, however, the C oncertacion’s
leftist parties criticized Frei’s stance,
stretching the integrity o f the coali
tion to its limits. Yet, while fissures
had always been evident, rum ors of
the C oncertacion’s death were
greatly exaggerated.
T h e I n t e r n a t io n a l R e a c t io n

Overshadowing the implications
of the P inochet case for C hile’s
dom estic politics is the in tern atio n 
al prerogative to punish dictators
who grossly violate the hum an
rights o f their citizens.
International law proved am enable
and Garzon was active in utilizing it.
Aside from Pinochet, Garzon target
ed 37 o ther form er governm ent
officials and military officers, whom

o
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R

Pinochet and the search for justice in Chile

Pinochet’s case highlights the long-term problems of dealing with
the past, in Latin America and elsewhere.
the Chilean governm ent advised
no t to leave the country. Garzon
also gained the largely symbolic sup
p o rt of the European Parliam ent,
which issued a declaration congrat
ulating both Spain and Great
Britain for detaining Pinochet.
Garzon argued that the 1948
Geneva Conventions allow any
country to try cases involving seri
ous crimes against hum an rights,
regardless of where they took place.
In addition, he pointed out that in
1985 the U nited Nations expanded
its definition of genocide to include
exterm ination of political oppo
nents. U nder Spanish law, fu rth er
m ore, Spanish courts are justified in
proceeding with cases involving
genocide. Garzon had already
gained notoriety by bringing
charges against 110 A rgentine mili
tary and police officers accused of
the most serious violations against
Spanish citizens during the period
of m ilitary rule in Argentina. These
cases led him to investigate
"O peration Condor," in which the
Chilean governm ent illegally coor
dinated swaps o f political prisoners
with o th er South Am erican military
regimes. T he culm ination of these
investigations was his effort to seek
P in o ch et’s detention for genocide
against victims o f any nationality,
no t only Spaniards.
G arzon’s case had been proceed
ing for m onths before Pinochet was
arrested, and the Chilean govern
m ent m ade clear that it did n o t rec
ognize the legitimacy o f Spanish

courts to prosecute Chileans. Even
Spanish Prim e M inister Jose M aria
Aznar stated publicly that he disap
proved bu t could do nothing.
Debate ensued as to w hether
P inochet’s arrest was legal. As a
senator, he was traveling on a diplo
matic passport, and the Chilean
governm ent argued that he was on
an official mission to discuss possi
ble arm s sales. Nevertheless, the
1961 V ienna C onvention on
Diplomatic Relations does not grant
im m unity from prosecution unless
the diplom at is formally accredited
with the host country. No interna
tional law or convention prohibits
prosecution o f visiting heads of
state, weakening even fu rth er claims
o f im m unity by a form er head of
state.
Since World War II, many states—
particularly in W estern E urope—
have codified into national law the
ability to try universal crimes against
humanity. In the 1990s, both
Rwandans and Serbs were prosecut
ed (and even jailed) for violating
these laws. P inochet’s case is differ
ent. Despite the glaring and brutal
violations of hum an rights during
his regim e, P inochet continues to
enjoy dom estic and international
support, and he is a senator.
Form er British Prim e Minister
M argaret T hatcher published a let
ter stating that P inochet "was a
good friend to this country during
the Falklands War. By his actions
the war was shortened and many
British lives were saved." Calls for

his release came also from form er
US president G eorge Bush, H enry
Kissinger, Jessie Helms, and even
the Vatican. With influential allies,
Pinochet was in a m uch b etter posi
tion to resist prosecution.
Skeptics also began to worry
about the power of national courts.
As a result o f G arzon’s efforts,
judges and citizens in eight o th er
E uropean countries initiated indict
m ents against Pinochet. If he could
be arrested, then did not every
national leader potentially face the
same threat? President Frei asked
rhetorically w hether a Chilean court
could then initiate proceedings for
crimes com m itted u n d e r the
Spanish dictatorship o f Francisco
Franco. A round the world, critics
w arned of a dangerous preced en t
that would en g en d er frivolous
attem pts at prosecution, while sup
porters clam ored for prosecution of
dictators and their followers. By
January 1999, Portuguese lawyers
had announced plans to seek the
extradition of form er Indonesian
president Suharto for the killings he
ordered in East Timor, a Portuguese
colony forcibly annexed by
Indonesia in 1976. P in o ch et’s fate
will represent an im p o rtan t prece
d en t for these and similar cases.
B r it a in ’s D il e m m a

O nce the decision regarding
extradition was in British hands, the
issue was far m ore political than
juridical. O n O ctober 30, 1998, the
English High C ourt ru led that
Pinochet should never have been
arrested, since he was head of state
when the crimes were com m itted
and therefore entitled to immunity.
Lawyers for the Spanish govern
m en t appealed, and the case was
Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two
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referred to a five-member panel
from the House of Lords. In the
m eantim e, H om e Secretary Jack
Straw, E ngland’s top cabinet-level
judicial authority, had the authority
to o rd e r P inochet’s release. He was
lobbied intensely to do so by
Pinochet supporters, who flew en
masse to E ngland to secure the gen
eral’s freedom . Straw could have
cited hum anitarian reasons based
on P inochet’s ill health, bu t the
irony was obvious; as many noted,
hum anitarian pardons were no t
issued to the thousands o f people
to rtu red and killed u n d er
P inochet’s direction.
From the perspective o f hum an
rights activists and Chileans adverse
ly affected by P in o chet’s rule
(including many m em bers o f the
governm ent and Congress who were
exiled, beaten a n d /o r had relatives
killed), the Spanish initiative rep re
sented the m ost prom ising way to
ju d g e Pinochet. In 1978, the mili
tary regim e proclaim ed an amnesty
th at granted a blanket pardon for
1973-1978, the period when the
bulk of the abuses occurred.
P inochet argued that the country
had been in a state o f war, and that
any "excesses" should be viewed in
this light. A lthough the dem ocratic
governm ents of the post-1990 peri
od did prosecute a few officers,
including fo rm er intelligence chief
M anuel C ontreras, these successes
came only after significant conces
sions to the army.
T he only rem aining way to ju d g e
P inochet was to enact a constitu
tional m easure accusing him o f vio
lating the n atio n ’s honor. A group
o f Christian Democrats forced this
m easure to a vote in early 1998,
w hen Pinochet retired from the
army and en tered the Senate. They
were defeated by a com bination of
m ilitary pressure and exhortations
from both cu rren t and form er gov
ern m en t officials, including
President Aylwin. These officials
argued that the proposal ran
Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two

co u n ter to the decision to avoid
antagonizing P inochet in favor of
dem ocratic stability, and that it
would com plicate governm ent-arm y
relations ju st as Izurieta took con
trol. Thus, although twelve sepa
rate cases against P inochet have
been launched in Chile, the
am nesty law an d his senatorial
im m unity alm ost certainly doom
them to failure.
Straw took no action, and both in
Chile an d abroad there was consen
sus th at the H ouse of Lords would
no t overturn the High C o u rt’s deci
sion. But on Novem ber 15, 1998
(P inochet’s eighty-third birthday),
the panel voted 3-2 to deny im m u
nity, ensuring that the general
would rem ain in custody. In
Decem ber, Straw decided th at the
extradition process should begin,
opening the way to m onths o f hear
ings, deliberations and appeals.
T he Chilean arm y and navy
issued official declarations in
protest. Both asserted th at the mili
tary governm ent had been C hile’s
savior in a tim e o f national crisis.
T he arm y w ent further, com plain
ing th at the Chilean governm ent’s
efforts to release P inochet had
been inadequate. P inochet him self
sent a letter addressed to all
Chileans in which he defended the
1973 coup and claim ed that the
army had acted to save the "funda
m ental values o f o u r civilization"
from com m unism . Subsequently,
everything he did was rooted in
"thinking of the liberty o f Chileans,
their well-being and national unity."
He w ent on to assert th at he was
the "object o f a political-juridical
m achination, crafty and cowardly,
which has no m oral value."
Meanwhile, P inochet’s lawyers
succeeded in overturning the
H ouse of L ords’ decision by noting
a conflict of interest regarding one
of the p an e l’s m em bers, who had
close ties to Amnesty International.
A new panel was charged to begin
deliberations all over again. On

M arch 24, 1999, the Law Lords
ru led that Pinochet was not
im m une, bu t could n o t be tried for
crimes com m itted before D ecem ber
1998, when Britain signed the
International C onvention on
Torture. U n d er these term s, only
three o f the original 32 charges still
stood. T he Law Lords also asked
Straw to decide w hether o r not
P inochet could face extradition.
O n April 15, Straw decided affirm a
tively, thus ensuring that the case
would continue for m onths.
F u t u r e I m p l ic a t io n s

In many ways, the P inochet case
helped define C hile’s last presiden
tial election, in D ecem ber 1999.
The two parties on the Chilean
right (the conservative
In d e p en d en t Dem ocratic U nion
and the m oderate National
R enovation), often at odds, u n ited
beh in d dem ands to bring Pinochet
back to Chile. They even called on
Frei to expel the Socialist Party
from the governm ent, blam ing it
for failing to secure P in o ch et’s
release. Despite this cam paign,
their candidate, Jo aq u m Lavfn
(UDI), a conservative mayor o f an
affluent Santiago suburb, lost to the
C oncertacion’s Ricardo Lagos in a
ru n o ff vote in Jan u ary 2000. Lagos,
a well-known politician and form er
Socialist cabinet m em ber, ran a
cam paign that highlighted the left’s
concerns bu t largely avoided the
P inochet issue.
P inochet’s arrest convulsed
Chilean politics, underlin in g the
dilem m a of pursuing justice in diffi
cult political contexts. T here is no
th reat o f a coup d ’etat in Chile, b u t
the governm ent m ust address a
politically active m ilitary that has
exerted considerable and consistent
influence even after the transition
to democracy. Regardless of the
final outcom e, P in o ch et’s case has
highlighted the long-term problem s
of dealing with the past, in Latin
America and elsewhere. ■
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Toward a New Partnership?
Paul Sutton

I

n in tern atio n al relations, all
Poverty and paradise do not coexist easily in the minds of most
is change and uncertainty.
Yet, longstanding relations
Europeans; insofar as paradise has the edge over poverty in
between countries and estab
popular perception, the Caribbean will suffer.
lished ways o f conducting
in tern atio n al affairs bring a
m easure o f stability and predictabil
ic principles an d the rule of law,
u ed E uropean presence in the
ity. O ne o f the m ore en d u rin g of
and good governance.”
C aribbean, and in particular, the
these relationships is that between
This w ording has touched a raw
EU ’s role in such areas as hum an
E urope and the C aribbean, which
nerve with some in the ACP. The
rights, econom ic developm ent and
m arked its half m illennium in 1992.
C aribbean especially is sensitive to
trade.
In the last 500 years, E urope has
perceived infringem ents o f its sov
left deep legacies in the region,
ereignty, b u t in this case, the critics
T h e E u r o p e a n U n io n a s F o r e ig n
both tangible and intangible, good
may be overreacting. T he EU p ro 
P o l ic y A c t o r
and bad. To this day, the b ound
posals are p art o f a general move
For the EU, the Lome
aries o f the E uropean U nion (EU),
m en t toward greater conditionality
C onvention is but one o f several
rep resen ted by the French
in the provision o f developm ent
frameworks for dealing with the
D epartem ents d ’Outre-M er, the
assistance, a process driven by the
developing world. Recently, the EU
N etherlands Antilles and the British
O rganization for Econom ic
has upgraded its interests in Latin
D ep en d en t Territories (newly
C ooperation an d D evelopm ent’s
America, especially the M ercosur
ren am ed Overseas T erritories),
m ajor aid donors. They also find
countries, and in Asia. In engaging
ex tend to the C aribbean. Since
support am ong the E uropean pu b 
with these areas, the EU is seeking
1975, the co rnerstone of this rela
lic, particularly the m ajor n o n 
com m ercial and political advantage,
tionship has b een the Lome
governm ental developm ent organi
with only passing reference to the
C onvention.
zations (NGDOs). T he proposals
provision o f developm ent assis
T he Lom e C onvention is the sin
are being presented as p art o f an
tance. This is consistent with a
gle m ost im p o rtan t fram ework for
established process o f political dia
greater em phasis in EU external
bringing the largest nu m b er of
logue that the Libreville
relations on political issues an d a
underdeveloped countries (the 71
D eclaration, which outlines the
h eightened vocation by many in the
countries of Africa, the C aribbean
principles governing the ACP’s
E uropean Commission, the EU ’s
an d the Pacific, collectively known
approach to the Lom e negotiations,
executive body, to provide the EU
as the ACP) into a close ‘develop
agreed had value.
with the power to exercise political
m e n t’ relationship with the largest
The Com m onw ealth C aribbean
leadership in global affairs.
bloc o f developed countries (the 15
has n o thing to fear from political
T he political dim ension is a core
m em ber states of the EU). The
dialogue, and m uch to gain if it can
feature o f the C om m ission’s p ro 
original convention was signed in
add its particular concerns to those
posals for a new Lom e C onvention.
1975 and renegotiated in 1980,
of the EU. O ne obvious considera
This
is
perhaps
m
ost
clearly
stated
1985 and 1990; in its cu rren t form ,
tion is coherence betw een the in ter
in
the
pream
ble
to
the
Draft
it runs until February 29, 2000.
nal policies o f the EU and their
N egotiating M andate the
Negotiations to d eterm ine its future
external effects. A no th er is rela
Commission released in Jan u ary
shape began in S eptem ber 1998.
tions with third parties which
1998.
This
d
o
cum
ent
states
that
At stake is the n ature o f the continadversely affect ACP interests (such
the convention will contain “an
as the cu rre n t conflict with the
essential elem ents clause” confirm 
U nited States over the EU banana
ing
that
the
policies
of
all
parties
to
Paul Sutton is director of the Centre for
regim e). O th er concerns, as listed
the
convention
are
“inform
ed
by
Developing Area Studies at the
in the ACP negotiating m andate,
respect
for
hum
an
rights,
dem
ocrat
University of Hull, England.
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Thefuture of Caribbean-European Union relations

include treatm en t o f ACP im mi
grants in the EU, extraeconom ic
activities o f transnational com pa
nies, transboundary m ovem ent and
disposal of hazardous waste, drug
trafficking and m oney laundering.
T he EU proposals should therefore
n o t be resisted as a m atter of princi
ple, b u t rath er rew orked to provide
a g enuine forum for regular
exchanges o f views with the goal of
im proved cooperation and a m ore
equal partnership.
T he Commission also proposes a
g reater engagem ent with civil soci
ety. T he C aribbean can make its
presence felt in this area, drawing
on the well-established dem ocratic
tradition in the majority o f its states
an d the wide range of interest
groups active in various national
debates. These n eed to be h ar
nessed if there is to be a genuine
political dialogue about Lome. The
parties involved m ust also reevalu
ate how such a forum should be
structured. To date, governm ents,
the private sector an d NGDOs have
held separate discussions, a selec
tive pursuit o f interest th at leaves
the C aribbean op en to the strate
gies o f divide and rule it claims the
m etropolitan powers practice in the
region.
D e v e l o p m e n t C o o p e r a t io n

In discussing the future of Lome,
it is im p o rtan t to realize what is at
stake in developm ent assistance
alone (separating it for the m om ent
from trade, which in the past has
b een the o th er core elem ent o f the
Lom e package). In the period
1975-1995, the EU ’s own develop
m en t program (as distinguished
from th at o f individual EU states)
earm arked approxim ately $2.08 bil

lion dollars for the in d ep en d e n t
states and d ep e n d en t territories of
the C aribbean. Proportionately, as
a region o f mostly small states, the
C aribbean did well on a p er capita
basis within the ACP grouping and
even b etter in relation to o th er
developing countries. In some
parts o f the C aribbean, and espe
cially am ong the sm aller states of
the Eastern Caribbean, such aid has
been especially significant.
T he key question for the
C aribbean is, how m uch o f this aid
is at risk in a successor convention?
T he answer is n o t easy to deter
m ine; it depends to a considerable
extent on a m uch wider debate on
the purpose and priorities o f devel
op m en t assistance. However, the
om ens are not good for the m ore
developed, high-incom e countries
of the region. T he EU, along with
o th er m ajor donors, has deter
m ined that developm ent assistance
should target the poorest countries.
In the C aribbean, Haiti an d Guyana
undoubtedly qualify, b u t the
Bahamas, Barbados, and m ost likely
T rinidad an d Tobago do not. T he
o th er states are som ewhere in
between. Political and procedural
considerations undoubtedly play a
role in such assessments, b u t there
is also a m oral dim ension to the
p erception o f lesser n eed in the
C aribbean which is linked to the
popular im age o f the region as an
idyllic holiday destination. Poverty
and paradise do no t coexist easily
in the m inds o f m ost Europeans;
insofar as paradise has the edge
over poverty in popular perception,
the C aribbean will suffer.
In any successor arran g em en t to
Lome, the C aribbean will have to
dem onstrate objective need.

C u rren t thinking has advanced the
idea o f vulnerability as the key to
the special needs o f the reg io n ’s
sm aller states. Small states, it is
argued, are m ore vulnerable than
larger ones to econom ic shocks,
environm ental risks an d security
threats. In particular, small devel
oping states (those with a popula
tion o f 1.5 m illion o r less) exhibit
greater volatility of o u tp u t com 
p ared to large states as a conse
quence of greater exposure to
external econom ic forces an d envi
ronm ental hazards. W hen these
factors are taken into account and
quantified in a com posite vulnera
bility index, 20 small ACP states out
o f a sam ple of 100 developing states
are categorized as m ost vulnerable.
O f these, seven are in the
Caribbean.
T he idea o f a vulnerability index
has yet to win general recognition.
T he figures cited above are from a
study com m issioned by the
Com m onw ealth Secretariat, which
has prom oted the use o f such an
index. Its value to the C aribbean
and o th er small developing coun
tries, m ost o f which are defined as
m iddle-incom e states, is to provide
a case for special consideration in
accessing official developm ent assis
tance. T he Commission appears
sym pathetic to such argum ents; its
Draft N egotiating M andate m en
tions th at special provision will be
m ade for vulnerable states, includ
ing landlocked and island coun
tries. It also proposes th at the over
all figure for program m able
resources (those directed to specific
countries and regions) "will be cal
culated in the light o f a co u n try ’s
estim ated needs—size, population,
incom e, vulnerability, geographical
Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two
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situation—and an assessment of its
merits based on perform ance and
sound m anagem ent." If these are
indeed the criteria, then many states
in the Caribbean will be able to
m eet them in full.
T rade

The same cannot be said for trade.
This has always been a contentious
area in ACP-EU relations and the
m ost im portant elem ent of the
Lome Convention for the
Caribbean. The Commission’s cur
ren t proposals have ru n into opposi
tion from all sides. Both the British
governm ent and the International
D evelopm ent Com mittee of the
House of Commons, which released
a detailed rep o rt on renegotiation of
the Lome Convention in May 1998,
believe they will be unworkable in
their present form. The ACP shares
their concern, as do virtually all
m ajor NGDOs in Europe.
As far as the Caribbean is con
cerned, there are two m ajor issues:
w hether the region will benefit from
a Free Trade Area (FTA) with the
EU, and what will happen to existing
trade protocols. With respect to
trade frameworks, the Commission
spells out three options:
• The status quo for least developed
countries (LDCs) that can continue
to benefit from cu rrent Lome pref
erences. In the Caribbean, this
option applies only to Haiti.
• A dapting non-LDCs to the EU ’s
general system o f preferences
(GSP). This option is open to all
Caribbean states; however, prelim i
nary research suggests that it implies
considerable loss of benefits, with
the Caribbean seriously affected as a
group.
• The negotiation of an FTA with
the EU by 2005. The Commission
believes th at the Caribbean will
choose this option, since it possesses
the greatest cohesion and the most
12 Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Nuinber Two

advanced regional organization
am ong the ACP states. A m ajor
Caribbean concern is that such an
agreem ent could divert rather than
create trade.
Which option is best for the
Caribbean? A nthony Gonzales of
T rinidad’s Institute o f International
Relations has studied this question
in depth and reached the conclu
sion that "an FTA would appear in
the long term to be a superior
instrum ent to most favoured nation,
GSP and Lome. It would expand
m arket size by providing better
access to FTA preferences as well as
offer greater security of m arket
access, transparency and stable rules.
It could better focus the attention of
the region on dynamic gains by
exam ining other trade barriers, pro
tective rules of origin and restrictive
investm ent provisions that im pede a
better flow of efficiency-seeking
investm ent to areas where the
region exhibits competitiveness." A
Caribbean-EU FTA could be m ade
com patible with any agreem ents
em erging from the Free Trade Area
of the Americas and with WTO
rules, which the EU insists are essen
tial to all its trade agreements.
Although an FTA may eventually
be best for the Caribbean, a great
many issues rem ain to be clarified
and negotiated. In general, howev
er, the argum ents against an ACPEU free trade agreem ent are most
valid in the African context. The
Caribbean is a different m atter; sub
ject to appropriate safeguards, a
Caribbean FTA tilts the balance
toward the future of trade liberaliza
tion rather than the past of trade
preference. It opens the prospect of
a customized framework in which
new instrum ents can be devised to
improve competitiveness and devel
op new products and markets. Such
gains may no t be possible within an
ACP-wide agreem ent. O n this issue,
the Caribbean m ust part company
with Africa.

E u r o p e a n In t e r e st s

and the

C a r ib b e a n

Britain, France and the
N etherlands have direct interests in
the Caribbean, and Spain a marginal
but significant one. T heir responsi
bilities have m ounted in recent
years, as drug trafficking and money
laundering have jo in ed developm ent
and good governance on the list of
European concerns. T he sum of
these interests ensures that the
region com m ands attention it would
n o t otherwise receive.
New political and social dim en
sions have also been introduced into
what was once a largely econom ic
portfolio of concerns. The
M aastricht Treaty, and m ore recently
the Treaty of Amsterdam, have
expanded the EU’s com petence in a
n um ber of areas, including social
policy; com m on citizenship; cooper
ation on police, judicial and immi
gration affairs; and cooperation for
a com m on foreign and security poli
cy. All these rebound on the
Caribbean and have particular
im portance for the EU ’s possessions
and territories in the region. The
EU and its m em ber states therefore
have a considerable interest in stabil
ity, security and developm ent in the
Caribbean, giving the Caribbean
ACP a rarely acknowledged advan
tage in negotiations.
The operative factor in EUCaribbean relations can best be
described as “interest plus.”
National and regional interests are
clearly at work for both parties. In
addition, the intangibles of shared
history and shared culture continue
to play an influential role. It is only
natural to expect some dilution of
this com m on heritage over time,
and the pace of global change has
helped to speed up the process. Yet,
such relationships are by nature
enduring even as they adm it change.
It is in this spirit that E urope and
the C aribbean should seek to m ain
tain their partnership in a renew ed
Lom e Convention. ■
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The Banana Wars
Adam Levy

F

ew would have thought
that a Hade conflict involv
ing im port barriers on
Latin American bananas
could drag the US into a
heated trade conflict with
the European Union (EU). Yet, on
March 3, 1999, the Clinton adminis
tration unilaterally imposed trade
sanctions on European products val
ued at $520 million, an am ount the
US claims equals the losses incurred
by its commercial interests due to
European banana im port restrictions.
The reprisal came after three favor
able rulings in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) condem ned the
EU’s banana trade restriction as a vio
lation of international trade law,
although a subsequent ruling last
April trim m ed the am ount of US
sanctions authorized to $191.4 mil
lion.
The roots of the conflict go back to
1993, when Latin America’s bananaproducing countries entered into a
dispute with Europe and its form er
Afro-Caribbean-Pacific colonies
(known collectively as the ACP). In
what came to be known as the
Declaration of Guayaquil, on
February 12, 1993, eight Latin
American countries pledged to fight
the European banana im port regime
collectively using GATT’s dispute res
olution mechanisms. In these days
before US involvement, the conflict
was notable for the divergent levels of
economic power am ong the major
players: the European Economic
Community (EC)—an economic pow
erhouse—confronted a loose coali-
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1 4 Hemisphere • Volume Niue, Number Two

Reports: International Trade

Might still makes right in international trade politics

European import regimes have clashed with the interests of banana-exporting companies and non-ACPcountries.

tion made up of Costa Rica,
Colombia, Panama, Ecuador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and
Venezuela. Given Latin America’s
emphasis on outward-oriented mod
els of development, the evolution of
the conflict during this period pro
vides im portant insights as to whether
international trade dispute mecha
nisms can function effectively to
defend Latin America against the
unfair trading practices of m ore pow
erful developed countries.
D ollar B ananas

and

A C P B ananas

The 1993 EC trade legislation limit
ed Latin American banana imports to
two million metric tons beginning in
1994, subjected them to a tariff of 100
Ecus (US $175) and created a com

plex im port licensing scheme.
Europe justified the trade restrictions
to protect form er ACP colonies, such
as Jamaica, the Philippines, St. Lucia,
the Windward Islands, Cameroon and
the Ivory Coast, and European
domestic possessions, including
Guadeloupe, Martinique and the
Balearic Islands. Since 1975, the
Lome Convention had granted ACP
countries trade preferences on
bananas, with the rationale that many
ACP producers are smaller and less
competitive than their Latin
American counterparts. U nder the
new system, ACP countries and
European possessions were allocated
duty-free annual quotas of 857,700
and 854,000 metric tons, respectively.
Latin Americans greeted Europe’s

new banana trade policy with predic
tions of economic devastation. Latin
American producers had increased
the am ount of land under banana
cultivation in the 1980s, expecting
increased dem and from a newly uni
fied Europe and Germany. Trade
analysts estimated that the new restric
tions would result in a global glut of
900,000 metric tons of surplus pro
duction.
To the US multinationals that dom
inate the commercialization of Latin
American production, the most griev
ous aspect of Europe’s banana trade
policy was the complicated licensing
scheme it introduced. These regula
tions required an im port license for
every box of bananas brought into
the EU. O f the newly reduced mar
Hemisphere • Volume Nitte, Number Two
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The banana conflict highlights the advantages of regional integration for Latin America.

ket of two million metric tons now
allocated to Latin America, the EU
gave many im port licenses to
European prim ary importers, banana
distributors and ripeners, even
though many of these companies had
not im ported bananas directly from
Latin America before. Once the
im port regime took effect, the licens
es were a requirem ent for anyone
wishing to sell in Europe. They
could be sold without im porting any
fruit at all for an average price of
between $4 and $8. U nited Fruit, the
largest US exporter to the EU, bore
the b ru n t of the licensing scheme.
Its EU m arket share declined by
about 25% from 1991 to 1994,
according to EU officials.
E u r o p e ’s D iv id e

and

Conquer

S t r a teg y

Negotiations between the EU and
Latin America began in earnest in
Decem ber 1993, as part of the clo
sure o f the GATT Uruguay Round.
From the outset, the Europeans indi
cated their desire for a prom pt reso
lution of the dispute, which cast an
embarrassing light on the trade poli
16 Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Nwnber Two

cies of a newly formed, borderless
Europe. The talks centered on four
main points: quotas for individual
countries, total ceiling limits for
imports from Latin America, control
of im port licenses and tariff reduc
tions.
The European strategy for resolv
ing the conflict was to exploit the
cleavages within the coalition of Latin
American banana-producing nations.
Only Costa Rica, Colombia,
Guatemala, Venezuela and Nicaragua
were GATT members in 1993, and of
these countries, only two— Costa Rica
and Colombia—were "substantial
producers" in the European market.
Hence, the best EU strategy would be
to induce Costa Rica and Colombia,
the pivotal players in the negotia
tions, to drop their GATT case.
The most divisive issue was the
EU’s proposal to establish quotas for
individual countries. Quotas, by their
very nature, penalize the most effi
cient producers of a given commodi
ty by freezing their market share,
while offering stability to producers
with higher costs who are under
threat from low-cost producers.

Ecuador, the world’s largest and low
est-cost producer of bananas, strongly
opposed a quota, since between 1991
and 1993 it had become the single
largest exporter to the EU. Costa
Rica, on the other hand, was more
willing to accept a quota. Costa
Rican producers had to contend with
higher costs, due to higher wages and
overhead. Before being displaced by
Ecuador, Costa Rica had been the
largest exporter of bananas to
Europe and thus could argue that it
deserved the largest m arket share.
The EU’s Decem ber 1994 proposal
was weighted heavily in favor of Costa
Rica and Colombia. It proposed
allocating the m arket as follows:
Costa Rica, 23.4%; Colombia, 22%;
Ecuador, 20.2%; Panama, 19.7%;
Honduras, 6.8%; Nicaragua, 1.9%;
and Guatemala, 1.5%. Venezuela
and other "third party" countries
jointly received a 4.5% m arket share.
Further sweetening the deal, the
Europeans recognized a Costa Rican
dem and that Latin America control
Europe’s im port licenses. However,
in a move that would further compli
cate the selling of bananas in the
European market, the EU created a
entire new layer of licenses called
"export licenses,” of which Latin
America would get 70%. As a final
concession, the Europeans raised the
Latin America quota to 2.1 million
metric tons in 1994 and 2.2 million
in 1995, and lowered the Latin
American tariff from 100 Ecus ($100)
to 75 Ecus ($75).
The deal m eant that Costa Rica
received the largest m arket share,
even though it had lost its status as
the leading banana exporter to
Europe in the early 1990s. Colombia
received the second largest market
share, despite the fact that Panama
traditionally had exported m ore
bananas to Europe. Costa Rica and
Colombia would also benefit dispro
portionately from the export licenses.
Both had large contingents of nation
al producers who would gain eco
nomic leverage vis-a-vis the American
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multinationals by holding the licens
es. Countries such as Panama,
Honduras and Guatemala, whose
national producers were a smaller
and less potent political force, valued
the export licenses less.
Despite a GATT ruling in January
1994 condem ning the EU’s new
trade regime as a violation of interna
tional trade law, four countries ulti
mately accepted quotas. In what
became known as the Framework
Agreement, Costa Rica received
23.4% of the market. Colombia
received 21%, while Nicaragua set
tled for 3% and Venezuela for 2%.
In addition, the EU designated 4.3%
of the Latin American quota to nontraditional suppliers. Honduras,
Panama, Guatemala and Ecuador, of
which Guatemala was the only GATT
member, rejected their quotas and
vowed to continue pressuring the EU
for a m ore acceptable solution using

GATT/WTO procedures. These
countries were lum ped into a "non
quota" category by the Europeans,
entitling them to approximately
46.3% of the European market.
Mexico, also a banana producer but
not a large exporter to Europe,
played a m inor role in the negotia
tions and joined the group of hold
outs.
C l a sh

of the

T it a n s

The US finally entered the conflict
in 1996, lodging a com plaint in the
WTO with the other protesting coun
tries. After the WTO ruled against
the EU in 1997, the Europeans modi
fied their im port regime slightly by
abolishing the export licenses.
Otherwise, they m aintained many of
the regim e’s major tenets. It was not
until the US inflicted reciprocal eco
nomic damage under Section 301 of
US trade law that the Europeans

returned to the negotiating table and
pledged again to make their banana
im port regime WTO-compliant.
This case suggests that the threat of
collateral economic damage, when
applied within the framework of the
WTO, is sometimes the only way to
dislodge the unsavory trade practices
of powerful nations. The implication
for Latin America is that regional
integration may be the best way to
protect the area’s trading rights.
Regional trading blocs enhance Latin
America’s attractiveness as a market,
along with its capacity to inflict recip
rocal economic damage when devel
oped countries violate m em bers’
trading rights. With US sanctions
beginning to affect European
exporters, the question remains
whether the Europeans will follow
through with their pledge or accept
the consequences of US trade penal
ties. ■
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Crisis in the Brazilian Amazon
Janet M. Cheniela

n the decade between 1988
and 1998, Brazilian policy
regarding the Amazon rainfor
est abrupdy turned from
“brown” to “green.” This was
most apparent in Amazonas,
the largest state in Brazil, accounting
for one-third of the 1.9 million
square miles designated as Legal
Amazonia. The shift to preservation
ist policies is best explained not by
growing environmental awareness,
but rather by political and economic
processes occurring at the interna
tional level. This article traces the
reversal in political positioning, sug
gesting contributing factors that may
explain changing policies toward the
Amazonian forest and its preserva
tion.

I

T he B oo m

of

B lack G o ld

The Brazilian Amazon has long
been characterized by a continuum
of slow economic growth, interrupt
ed at intervals by peaks of economic
prosperity. For four h undred years—
from the sixteenth through the mid
twentieth centuries—wealth was
derived principally from the export
of forest products. The most eco
nomically significant of these prod
ucts was rubber, latex extracted from
the Amazonian tree Hevea brasiliensis.
D em and for this commodity surged
in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, when first vulcanization, and
then the nascent automotive indus
try, catapulted world dem and for rub
b er to unprecedented levels.
Rubber was a m inor export in the
first half of the nineteenth century.

Janet M. Chernela is professor of anthro
pology at Honda International
University.
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In the mid 1800s, however, advances
in vulcanization processes increased
the strength and resilience of rubber
and broadened its application to a
wide range of commodities. Rubber
became Brazil’s principal export in
1871, and by 1909 Amazonia was the
source of 94.4% of the world’s rub
ber supply.
Brazil’s rubber boom came to an
end in 1913, when m anaged planta
tions in Malaysia outperform ed
Brazilian forest extractors. Previously,
Asia had contributed only minimal
am ounts of rubber to the world mar
ket (four tons in 1900, com pared to
Brazil’s 27,650). By 1913, however,
Asia had overtaken Brazil as the
world’s largest rubber producer. By
1918, Amazonia’s share of the world
rubber supply had fallen to 10.9%.
Just before World War II, when
Brazilian rubber came into tem po
rary dem and by Allied nations, its
contribution to the world market had
dim inished to 1.4%.
With no export commodity to
replace rubber, the economy of the
central Amazon entered a period of
stagnation. The region’s wealth was
concentrated in the city of Manaus,
strategically situated near the conflu
ence of the Negro and Amazon
Rivers. As the rubber boom dissipat
ed, Manaus contracted to a fraction
of its form er size, its revenue sources
limited to the export of a few raw for
est products.
A B oom

of a

Zo n a F ranca

D if f e r e n t K in d : T h e
of

M anaus

Manaus was lifted out of its stagna
tion in 1967, when the Brazilian gov
ernm ent decreed a portion of the
city to be duty free. The decree out
lined fiscal incentives from federal,
state and m unicipal governments to

attract industry to the north by allow
ing exemptions on steep im port
duties. The plan was designed to
attract industrial development, partic
ularly electronic assembly plants, that
relied on im ported components.
The duty-free area was designated the
Zona Franca de Manaus, or Manaus
Free Trade Zone.
The decree came in the context of
a Brazilian economy that was rigor
ously protected by trade barriers. In
the 1960s, approximately 3000 prod
ucts were prohibited from import,
while many others were subject to
hefty im port taxes of 80%. Firms
within the federally designated free
trade zone could sell im ported items
at prices that were no t available else
where in Brazil, providing them with
strong competitive advantages.
Given these conditions, it was cost
effective for Brazilians from the south
to travel to Manaus to purchase
im ported goods. Despite the city’s
distance from Rio de Janeiro and Sao
Paulo, thousands of Brazilians from
the m etropolitan south traveled there
annually to purchase tax-free luxury
and electronic goods. A passenger
leaving Manaus was perm itted to
carry up to $2,000 in tax-free im port
ed items.
Investors reacted quickly to the
new fiscal incentives. Having lan
guished for five decades, the econo
my of Amazonas state and its princi
pal city, Manaus, was spurred forward
by new industrial and commercial
development. Between 1970 and
1990, the zone attracted over 600
firms, including Honda, Kodak,
Olivetti, Philco/Ford, Philips, Sanyo,
Seiko, Sharp, Sony, Telefunken, 3M,
Toshiba and Xerox. This growth, in
turn, carried with it other parts of the
tertiary sector, particularly tourism.
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Global integration, the Zona Franca of Manaus and ecotourism

Domestic tourism to Manaus fueled
$150 million in hotel construction.
Employment rose correspondingly.
By 1989, virtually all the state’s rev
enue came from the tariff-free indus
trial sector, which produced $7 bil
lion in products and employed
137,000 people. Once a sleepy river
front town, by 1990 Manaus ranked
as Brazil’s largest m anufacturing cen
ter after Sao Paulo. The lure of jobs
caused the city’s population to surge
from 173,000 in 1960 to 1.5 million
in 1990. Two-thirds of the popula
tion of Amazonas was now concen
trated in Manaus.
T h e P o l it ic s

of

F o r est

D evelo pm ent

This monument was built in 1899 across from the Manaus Opera House— itself a tes
tament to the rubber boom— to commemorate the opening o f Amazonian ports and
rivers to foreign navigation. The figure a t the top is an allegory o f commerce.

During the period of growth of the
Zona Franca, the prevailing rhetoric
am ong national policy makers and
local Amazonas elites emphasized
development without regard for for
est preservation. T hroughout the
1970s and ‘80s, Brazil’s federal gov
ernm ent spent $7.5 billion to subsi
dize deforestation, including pro
grams that subsidized the clearing of
large tracts of forest for pasturage. In
less than two decades, at least 300
large-scale ranching operations
replaced formerly forested lands.
Three-time Governor of Amazonas
Gilberto Mestrinho pursued a policy
of distributing free chain saws to any
colonist who would “develop” the for
est. The policy rem ained in place
through the early 1990s.
The ideology of the times was
expressed in the 1985 speech, “Nossa
Natureza” (“O ur N ature”), in which
President Jose Sarney stressed the
threat to Brazilian national sovereign
ty posed by international environ
mentalists whose preservationist lan
guage, Sarney claimed, obscured
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Political and economic elites once eager to cut down the Amazonian rainforest now see it as an environmentally correct source of cash.

their own intentions to exploit the
riches of the forest. Preservation
became synonymous with foreign
appropriation.
The anti-environmentalist lobby
reflected the views of prom inent
commercial interests as well as those
of impoverished rural residents, for
whom the industrialized duty-free
zone provided employment.
Preservation was regarded as a frivoli
ty of the wealthy. Form er Governor
Mestrinho was quoted as saying that
foreign ecologists “want the Amazon
to be kept like a circus, with us as the
monkeys.”
Opposition to forest preservation
also em erged from the military,
which favored rapid development
along the no rth ern frontiers to
ensure Brazil’s sovereignty over its
hinterland. In 1985, vast tracts of
Amazonia were placed under nation
al security in a program known as
Calha Norte, com bining coloniza
20 Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two

tion, agriculture and security along
the northern borders.
T h e G r o w in g E c o n o m ic A r g u m e n t
in

Fa v o r

of

F o r e s t P r e se r v a t io n ;

How B u s in e s s a n d
in

A m azonas L earned

W o r r y in g

and

or

P o l it ic a l E lites
to

Stop

L ove N ature

Four concurrent processes con
tributed to change the attitudes of
Amazonian business and political
elites toward environmental preserva
tion: 1) the failure of large-scale colo
nization and ranching initiatives; 2)
the loosening of trade restrictions to
open the Brazilian economy; 3) the
recognition of international ecotourism as a potential source of
income; and 4) new fiscal incentives
from international sources targeting
developm ent projects that could be
judged both economically and eco
logically “sustainable.”
By the latter half of the 1980s, the
policy of subsidizing large ranching

ventures, intended to bring prosperi
ty to the north, had clearly failed. By
this time, m ore than 80% of the large
landholders receiving benefits had
abandoned their lands or sold them
to speculators.
At the same time, Brazil’s govern
m ent began to phase out trade pro
tections. In 1990, prices for im port
ed electronic goods and household
appliances were 50% to 275% higher
in Brazil than overseas. Brazil came
u n d er increasing pressure from inter
national entities, including multilater
al lending institutions, to remove bar
riers to free trade. In 1991, President
Fernando Collor de Melo removed
im port bans on m ore than 1,000
products and reduced im port tariffs
from 80% to 20%. Currently, Brazil’s
tax on im ported goods is approxi
mately 12%.
New global integration posed a
threat to the economy of Manaus.
The success of a free-trade zone in
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the n o rth depended upon protec
tions granted by the federal govern
m ent. Removal of trade barriers
would eliminate m uch of the zone’s
competitive advantage. In
Amazonas, the removal of trade bar
riers was regarded as an indication of
oscillating federal com m itm ent to
the region. Retail trade and domes
tic tourism in M anaus’s Zona Franca
began to decline as those protections
were threatened.
Travel to Manaus from the densely
populated south is limited by dis
tance and the remoteness of the loca
tion. Access by air from Brazil’s
largest cities is time consum ing and
expensive. Between 1980 and 1990,
a domestic flight from Rio de Janeiro
to Manaus (2,862 kms) took four
hours and cost m ore than an interna
tional flight to Miami. Travel to
Manaus for retail purchases, there
fore, was cost effective only if the
price of im ported goods within Brazil
rem ained at artificially high levels.
Removal of Brazil’s protections on
foreign goods eroded M anaus’s price
advantage and sent shoppers else
where. Between 1986 and 1991,
Brazilian visitors to the city’s Zona
Franca had averaged 175,000 annual
ly. With the removal of trade protec
tions, domestic tourism to Amazonia
plum m eted, dropping from 150,000
in 1989 to 96,973 in 1990-a decline
of 60% in one year. Correspondingly,
incom e and employment in the Zona
Franca also dropped. Revenues from
national sales in the zone dropped
from $6.5 billion in 1990 to $3.6 bil
lion in 1992, and rem ain below 1991
levels.
Among the goals of the Zona
Franca were jo b creation and income
for the no rth ern populations and the
consolidation o f liaisons between the
local economy and the overseas mar
ket. Manaus had become the fastestgrowing urban center and source of
employment in the north of Brazil.
Between 1990 and 1992, however,
employment in the Zona Franca
dropped dramatically, from 76,798

workers to 36,537. Salary expendi
tures in 1999 were the lowest since
the duty-free zone’s im plementation.
Indeed, the draw away from the rural
sector into the urban may have
served to deter deforestation by con
centrating an otherwise dispersed
population.
T h e G r e e n in g

of

C om m erce

The decline in domestic tourism to
the Zona Franca coincided with ris
ing expectations for a surge in inter
national ecotourism, with rainforests
am ong the favored destinations. A
1991 poll of international travelers
showed that 47% considered natural
features to be major criteria in vaca
tion planning, and an OAS study the
same year predicted that the num ber
of foreigners participating in nature
tours in the Amazon would triple
from 123,000 in 1988 to at least
375,000 by 1999.
Hoping that “green” tourism
would pick up where consum er
tourism left off, the Amazonas busi
ness community reversed its position
on rainforest preservation. Before
1990, environm ental protections had
been considered a luxury of wealthy
nations; now, these same protections
came to be regarded as economically
advantageous. With tourism infra
structure already in place, a rapidly
expanding world m arket in eco
tourism, and a commodity in the
form of “the largest rainforest on
earth,” Amazonian policy makers
came to view ecotourism as a source
of economic return for nature
preservation.
The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio
(UNCED) helped draw international
attention to the Amazon and served
as a lever to prom ote international
investment in Brazil. In 1993, the
Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) and the World Bank approved
credits exceeding one billion dollars
for projects in the Amazon. Credits
targeted environm ental preservation
and economic development. IDB
funding in 1996 and 1997 con

tributed to the developm ent of a
Tourism Development Program
(Prodetur) and provided $200 mil
lion to Brazil’s Ministry of
Environment. Half of the money
financed private sector investments
in Amazonian ecotourism, and the
other half was set aside for efforts to
improve and expand conditions for
ecotourism projects. The funding
included the production o f educa
tional materials aim ed at m aking
local Amazonian communities aware
that, in the words of Aldemir
Paraguassu, Secretary of Amazonian
Affairs, “nature sells.” Local
Amazonian institutions, including
those geared toward industrialization
of the Zona Franca, also were influ
enced by incentives from multilateral
banking agencies to prom ote eco
tourism. The result was the greening
of the duty-free zone itself.
The 1990s m arked a dramatic shift
in Brazilian governm ent and busi
ness attitudes toward the rainforest,
influenced mostly by international
political and economic pressures.
Prior to 1990, business and political
leaders in Amazonas consistently
opposed measures to preserve the
rainforest. Both the private and pub
lic sectors actively supported efforts
to clear the forest for ranching. In
the last decade, however, the same
sectors came to regard the forest
itself as a source of revenue.
According to the Brazilian news mag
azine Veja, the federal governm ent
spent $7.5 billion to subsidize defor
estation activities in the 1970s.
“Now,” the magazine reported in late
1997, “if the governm ent is consider
ing any program to subsidize
Amazonia, it is considering an
aggressive program to stimulate
tourism.” ■
Data published here were derived from the
Superintendencia da Zona Franca de
Manaus (SUFRAMA) and the Empresa
Amazonense de Turismo (EMAMTUR),
now the Secretary for Tourism and
Culture, among other sources.
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The O ther Journalism
Jose L uis Benavides

n the m orning of
November 16, 1959,
Trum an Capote was
flipping through the
pages of The New York
Times when he
0
stopped on page 39 to read a UPI
news story from Holcomb, Kansas,
headlined “Wealthy Farmer, 3 of
Family Slain.” Capote had been
looking for ideas to turn journalism
into a “serious” literary art form, the
“nonfiction novel,” and this crime in
Holcom b seem ed to him to be a per
fect opportunity to accomplish his
objective. The result was his cele
brated book In Cold Blood.
T hree years earlier, on the night
o f Ju n e 9, 1956, Rodolfo Walsh, a
young writer in La Plata, Argentina,
was playing chess in the Club
Capablanca when the sounds of
explosions and shotguns interrupted
his game. The noise came from the
Plaza San M artin, the site of the
heaviest fighting of a doom ed army
insurrection in support of Juan
Dom ingo Peron against the military
regim e of General Pedro Enrique
Aram buro. T hat night, Walsh later
learned, the police executed a
group o f civilians in a garbage
dum p—five were killed, one was
seriously w ounded, and five m ore
m anaged to escape. The police had
arrested the 11 m en as they listened

Dr. Jose Luis Benavides is a founding
member• of Corre(i)o, a nonprofit organi
zation devoted to the dissemination of
Latin American and Latino journalism.
He is co-author ofEscribir en prensa:
Redaction informativa e interpretativa
(Mexico City: Alhambra/Longman,
1997), a college textbook for journalism
students.
22 Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two

“I researched and narrated the tremendous facts to give them
the widest possible publicity, to make them inspirefear, to never
let them happen again. ”
—Rodolfo Walsh
to a boxing m atch on the radio in
the house o f a m an allegedly
involved in the uprising.
For a while, Walsh thought he
could forget the episode and contin
ue writing detective stories. But six
m onths later, on D ecem ber 18, a
friend told him the story of Juan
Carlos Livraga, a victim of the clan
destine execution, who had been
shot in the face but survived. Soon
after, Walsh began publishing stories
in the opposition press about
Livraga’s case. He tracked down
other survivors, changed his nam e,
bought a gun and went into hiding.
His nonfiction novel based on the
case, Operacion masacre, was first pub
lished in D ecem ber 1957, eight years
before In Cold Blood.
E n d in g

the

S il e n c e

Today, both Capote and Walsh are
considered, in their respective coun
tries, pioneers of the nonfiction
novel. In truth, neither writer
invented this art form, although
both influenced its development.
Unlike Capote, however, Walsh was
not trying consciously to create a
new literary genre when he wrote
Operacion masacre. He wrote the
book out of indignation—to
denounce a crime unrecorded in
the m ainstream press and to serve
the cause of justice. “I researched
and narrated the trem endous facts,”
Walsh wrote, “to give them the

widest possible publicity, to make
them inspire fear, to never let them
happen again.”
While Capote rem ained only spo
radically interested in journalism ,
Walsh was a journalist throughout
his life and tu rn ed his reporting and
writing into politically explicit tasks.
His work has had a growing influ
ence on contem poraryjournalism in
Latin America because it exemplifies
a key challenge faced by indepen
dent journalists: the need to over
come the silence of the m ainstream
press—the result o f fear or collu
sion— about crimes com m itted by
the state apparatus.
“D uring many m onths I have seen
the voluntary silence of the whole
‘serious press’ about this heinous
massacre, and I have felt asham ed,”
Walsh wrote in the introduction to
the first edition of Operacion masacre.
In 1964, in the preface to the sec
ond edition, he expressed even
greater disillusionment: “O ne
believes that a story like this one—
with a dead body that speaks—is
going to be disputed in the news
rooms; one believes that this is a
race against time, that at any time a
big daily will send a dozen reporters
and photographers like in the
m ovies...It is like a joke because,
seven years later, one can review the
newspaper archives, and this story
did no t exist then, n o r does it exist
now.”
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Rodolfo Walsh’s legacy of socially responsible reporting
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It is precisely their departure from the notion of objectivity and
their insistence on presenting alternative, counterhegemonic
accounts of events that has made these journalists’ work so
meaningful.
Walsh’s book becam e one o f the
first m ajor contem porary examples
of what one m ight call Latin
American “new” journalism . This
inform al literary and journalistic
m ovem ent denounced state crimes
that went u n rep o rted by the region’s
m ainstream press and influenced the
developm ent of ind ependent jo u r
nalism in Latin America. Gabriel
Garcia M arquez’s The Story of a
Shipwrecked Sailor (1955), for
instance, denounced the Colombian
navy for the deaths of a group of
sailors who were washed overboard
with ill-secured contraband from a
navy destroyer. O th er examples of
this genre include Elena
Poniatowska’s Massacre in Mexico
(1971), which chronicled the 1968
army massacre of hundreds of stu
dent dem onstrators in Mexico City;
Carlos Alberto L uppi’s Araceli
(1979), which exposed the coverup
of the kidnapping and assassination
of a teenager by local m agnates in
the Brazilian city of Vitoria; and
Miguel Bonasso’s Recuerdo de la
muerte (1984), which narrated in a
spy thriller form at the activities of
the Argentine military’s internation
al operatives during the so-called
dirty war.
Although the literary im portance
of these and o th er works has been
widely studied, their journalistic sig
nificance has been ignored or
underestim ated. Unlike its counter
part in the US, Latin Am erica’s new
journalism is n o t identified formally
as a specific movement. Two factors
contribute to this oversight. First,
some Latin American literary critics
and journalists exhibit a colonialist
mentality. A Spanish-language guide
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to Story of a Shipwrecked Sailor, for
example, cites Tom Wolfe as one of
Garcia M arquez’s main influences,
despite the fact that the reportage
was first published in 1955—seven
years before Wolfe got his first news
paper job. Second, those who m ain
tain that journalists must be objec
tive, im partial observers of events
believe that most Latin American
new journalists practice “advocate
journalism .” Instead of being im par
tial, critics charge, these journalists
prom ote social justice and social
change. But it is precisely their
departure from the notion of objec
tivity and their insistence on present
ing alternative, counterhegem onic
accounts of events that has m ade
these individuals’ work so m eaning
ful for Latin American journalism .
For instance, Poniatowska’s writ
ings about the 1968 massacre of stu
dents in Mexico City m ight be con
sidered biased because h er own
brother was am ong those killed. Yet,
since most of the mainstream
Mexican press only recorded the
official, m anicured version of events,
Massacre in Mexico quickly becam e a
standard college textbook that serves
as a good example of reportage for
journalism students.
Rodolfo Walsh advocated this
other kind of journalism , one that
refuses to be an accomplice of injus
tice. He and other Latin American
new journalists helped to establish
and sustain independent news m edia
outlets and spaces within the m ain
stream press for the practice of inde
pendent, investigative journalism ,
particularly in periods of extrem e
institutional repression. They prac
ticed what some call “socially com

m itted” journalism , opposing the
notion of objectivity valued in main
stream US journalism and em brac
ing instead a style closer in spirit to
that practiced by muckraking, inves
tigative and socially responsible jo u r
nalists. Their work has directly and
indirectly influenced the training of
young journalists and has helped to
strengthen freedom of speech in the
region.
A L ife ’s W o r k C u t S h o r t
By the time C apote’s In Cold Blood
was published in 1965, Walsh had
already published two editions of
Operacion masacre. Also, together
with a group of famous journalists
and writers—including Garcia
Marquez and fellow Colombian
Plinio Mendoza, the Uruguayan
Ju an Carlos Onetti, and the
Argentines Jorge Masetti and
Rogelio Garcia Lupo— he helped to
establish the Latin American news
agency Prensa Latina. Working for
that agency in the early 1960s, Walsh
becam e known am ong his colleagues
as “the m an who outdid the CIA”
after he deciphered a secret
telegram from Guatemala detailing
the plans o f CIA-sponsored Cuban
exiles to invade Cuba.
In 1968, Walsh established the
Peronista newsweekly CGT in collab
oration with Horacio Verbitsky, today
the most respected ind ependent
journalist in Argentina. CGT circu
lated legally until mid-1969 and clan
destinely until February 1970, when
the governm ent forced it to close.
W alsh’s work with the weekly gave
him material for a second nonfiction
book, i Quien mato a Rosendo ?, pub
lished in 1969. This reportage
described the m urder of a union
leader at the hands of co rru p t labor
union bosses who served the inter
ests of the Argentine governm ent
and foreign corporations.
Between 1972 and 1973, Walsh
worked in a com m unity project in
the villas miseria (shantytowns) of
Buenos Aires, teaching journalism
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and helping students publish the
Semanario Villero. By 1975, when his
last nonfiction book was published,
he had becom e a m em ber of the
M ontoneros—a leftist, nationalist
faction within Peronism o that
tu rn ed into an urban guerrilla move
m ent. He served as the crime editor
o f Noticias, a M ontonero daily closed
by the governm ent the following
year.
After the military coup in
Argentina on March 24, 1976, Walsh
and Verbitsky organized the clandes
tine news agency ANCLA and
denounced the military’s hum an
rights abuses. O n Septem ber 29 of
that year, Walsh’s daughter
Victoria—also a m em ber of the
M ontoneros—killed herself to avoid
capture during a military assault on
a guerrilla hideout. Six m onths
later, on March 25, 1977, Walsh him 
self was m urdered by a military
squad sent to kidnap him. Just
before the attack, he mailed his
famous “O pen Letter to the Military
Ju n ta” to Argentine newspapers. He
had finished writing it the day
before, on the first anniversary of
the coup. At the time, no Argentine
newspaper dared publish this letter,
described by Garcia M arquez as “a
masterpiece of universal journalism .”
It circulated clandestinely in
Argentina, found its way to some
Latin American ind ependent media,
and was later published by the
French magazine Esprit and the US
magazine Dissent.
Emile Zola’s “J ’Accuse” and the
entire Dreyfus affair pale in com pari
son to Walsh’s fate. After Zola
accused the French military of falsely
convicting Captain Alfred Dreyfus
and then covering up the affair, he
was charged with libel and forced to
leave France. But justice eventually
prevailed, and Zola’s letter becam e a
powerful symbol of the fight for free
dom of expression. Walsh accused
the military ju n ta of genocide and
provided the most detailed, critical
and docum ented appraisal of the

military regime inside and outside
Argentina. He was m urdered, the
ju n ta banned his writing, and his
contribution to the fight for free
dom of expression went unrecog
nized.
W a l s h ’s L e g a c y

Despite the totalitarian nature of
the military junta, Walsh’s voice
could no t be silenced completely.
N either military surveillance n o r the
risk of being killed or arrested
stopped journalism students from
learning about him and reading his
books.
“Walsh suddenly becam e our jo u r
nalistic m odel,” writes Gabriela
C erruti, editor-in-chief o f the news
magazine Trespuntos. H er book, Los
herederos del sikncio, recounts her
years as a journalism student at the
University of La Plata during the mil
itary dictatorship. Before the 1976
military coup, the journalism pro
gram at this university was the most
prestigious in the country. Its pro
fessors included such respected
names as Gregorio Selser, Silvio
Frondizi and Eduardo Galeano. In
the first few years following the
coup, 36 students and professors out
of a total of approximately 220 “dis
appeared.” The school closed for a
year and a half; it reopened under
heavy military surveillance in 1978.
Librarians were required to fill out a
form for each book checked out of
the library, making the inform ation
available to the military to identify
“subversives.” Even in this repressive
environm ent, C erruti rem em bers
that some librarians m anaged to
smuggle Walsh’s books to journalism
students.
Walsh influenced many of the
reporters who worked with him,
some of whom went on to become
well-known independent journalists.
In Recuerdo de la muerte, Miguel
Bonasso, who worked with Walsh at
the M ontonero daily, referred to
him as “my m entor.” Horacio
Verbitsky, a colleague at CGT and

ANCLA, edited a book in the mid1980s about Walsh’s clandestine
years. He described those times to
the Mexican journalist Alma
G uillerm oprieto as “the militant,
rancorous, aggressive, unforgiving
tradition of the nineteen seventies.”
In a book published in 1997 about
A rgentina’s greatest journalists and
publications, Walsh ranked third—
behind Verbitsky and Jacobo
Tim m erm an—in the num ber of
entries to his name. T hat same year,
his surviving partner, Lilia Ferreyra,
and his daughter, Patricia Walsh,
convinced the Argentine Congress to
reopen his case, find his body and
determ ine how he was killed.
The growing recognition of
Walsh's journalistic legacy culm inat
ed on March 25, 1998, when the
University of La Plata’s School of
Journalism announced its first
Rodolfo Walsh Journalism Awards.
The occasion was tim ed to com m em 
orate the twenty-first anniversary of
his assassination. It served as an
implicit rebuke to those who do not
count Walsh am ong the 91 jo u rn al
ists killed in Argentina between 1976
and 1983, on the grounds that he
was not an im partial reporter. This
group includes the two most widely
available books about Latin
American journalism published in
the US during A rgentina’s military
dictatorship, R obert Pierce’s Keeping
the Flame (1979) and Marvin Alisky’s
Latin American Media (1981), both of
which fail to m ention Walsh at all.
The Rodolfo Walsh Journalism
Awards promise to inspire another
kind of journalist: one who strives to
be as innovative in literary term s as
Capote, as investigative as Ida Tarbell
and George Seldes, and as danger
ous to those who abuse power as the
G erm an journalist G unter Wallraff.
The awards may also trigger a
renewed interest in the dissemina
tion o f the work of Latin Am erica’s
new journalists, prom oting both
freedom of expression and an inde
p endent and responsible press. ■
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Building the Fourth Estate
Chappell Lawson

I

n ju n e 1995, President
Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico
held a press conference in the
town of Cuauhtitlan. The
president was seeking to reas
sure his fellow citizens that
their country, then in the midst of
deep econom ic crisis and political
turm oil, was back on the right track.
In the course of his remarks, Zedillo
m ade reference to a group of “bad
guys” ( malosos) within the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRO. These naughty officials,
Zedillo implied, were responsible for
many o f M exico’s recent troubles,
including the 1994 assassinations of
the PRI’s leader, Jose Francisco Ruiz
Massieu, and the party’s presidential
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio.
Mexican journalists responded vig
orously to Zedillo’s comments. Did
he m ean that ruling party officials
were responsible for Colosio’s m ur
der? Who, exactly, were the officials
in question? Could the country’s
problem s really be blam ed on a
small group of individuals, however
nefarious? And was “bad guys” really
an appropriate term to describe
such people, given that their
extracurricular activities apparendy
included d ru g trafficking and politi
cal assassination?
The vehem ence o f the journalists’
reaction surprised many observers.
Traditionally, interactions between
the president and the press in
Mexico were carefully scripted
affairs. Questions were often plant
ed by governm ent officials; indepen
d en t newspapers were underrepre-

Chappell Lawson is an assistant profes
sor of political science at the
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sented, if at all; and the entire per
form ance was carefully edited before
being rebroadcast by the country’s
reliably pro-governm ent m edia con
glom erate, Televisa. Aggressive or
hostile inquiries were simply not
part of the regularly scheduled pro
gramming.
R eporters’ reactions to the malosos
incident exemplified the changes
that have occurred in Mexico’s
media. Over the past two decades,
in dependent publications have
em erged and flourished, supplanti
ng their m ore staid and traditional
counterparts. Feisty talk-radio shows
have come to dom inate the airwaves
in M exico’s largest cities. Even
broadcast television, long viewed as a
sort of private Ministry of
Inform ation, has begun to devote
m ore coverage to opposition and
civic groups. These changes have
brought increased m edia attention
to civil society and its viewpoints,
m ore even-handed coverage of elec
toral campaigns, m ore incisive criti
cism of the political system, and—
perhaps m ost dramatically—m ore
aggressive investigation o f potential
scandals.
T h e R ise

of

I n d e p e n d e n t M e d ia :

S o m e T h e o r ie s

W hat caused the rem arkable trans
form ation of Mexico’s media? One
familiar explanation for the success
of Mexico’s em erging fourth estate
is the general mellowing o f the
country’s political climate over the
last decade. In theory, w ithout this
political thaw, the governm ent could
have squashed any independent
publications— as it did when it
helped eject an independentm inded team of editors from
Excelsior new spaper in 1976. In this

sense, a m odicum o f political liberal
ization was probably necessary for
Mexico’s in dependent m edia to sur
vive and establish themselves.
At the same time, it would be inac
curate to portray political reform as
the principal driver o f m edia open
ing. Mexican journalists insist that
any autonom ous space the media
now enjoy is due to changes within
civil society and the m edia them 
selves, which gradually pried control
out of the governm ent’s hands. As
Jose Gutierrez-Vivo, host of the pop
ular in dependent radio show
“M onitor,” p u t it in 1996, “The
m edia did no t get opened from
above. We opened it. We broke the
limits.” Journalists are especially
adam ant about the limited influence
o f form er President Carlos Salinas
de Gortari (1988-94), sometimes
credited in the U nited States with
encouraging m edia openness.
Salinas initiated a num ber of modest
reform s in press-governm ent rela
tions and ended the practice of pay
ing bribes (known as embutes o r chayotes) to journalists at the presidential
palace itself. In general, however,
his adm inistration was never sympa
thetic to M exico’s ind ep en d en t
press, and it becam e increasingly
abusive toward the end of his term .
This impression was shared by virtu
ally all of the in depend en t jo u rn a l
ists interviewed in Mexico in 19951997, regardless of their opinions of
Salinas’s program of marketoriented reform . According to
Gutierrez-Vivo, “Salinas was the pres
ident who was hardest on the media.
He was the one who sought most
control over the m edia.”
T he Zedillo adm inistration (1994present) has been substantially m ore
tolerant of M exico’s in d ependent
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press, b u t M exican journalists still
regard its policies as partial and
contradictory at best. Am ong o th er
incidents, Zedillo’s tenure has wit
nessed a n u m b er o f physical
assaults against journalists and at
least a few w ell-docum ented cases
o f official harassm ent (such as the
arrest on tax evasion charges of the
publisher o f El Universal newspa
p er). F u rtherm ore, fundam ental
reform o f the legal architecture
governing M exico’s m edia was
blocked by the PRI’s legislative
majority du rin g the first h alf of
Zedillo’s adm inistration. R ather
than p rom ote m edia freedom , the
M exican governm ent has simply
failed to repress an in d ep en d e n t
press th at em erged for different
reasons.
A second explanation for the
changes in M exico’s m edia is the
im pact o f econom ic developm ent.
D uring the 1960s an d 1970s,
Mexico enjoyed steady econom ic
expansion, the spread o f mass ed u 

cation, im provem ents in living stan
dards, rapid urbanization and the
growth o f a substantial m iddle class.
This theory holds that the process
o f m odernization created the social
raw m aterial for in d ep en d e n t jo u r
nalism. In 1950, Mexico probably
did no t have the kind o f dem o
graphic profile that w ould have sup
po rted a diverse and in d ep en d e n t
prin t media. By 1990, proponents
of this hypothesis argue, it did.
T he tim ing o f m edia opening,
however, provides only lim ited and
conditional sup p o rt for this expla
nation. Mexicans did n o t becom e
richer, m ore educated or m ore lit
erate during the 1980s and 1990s,
and it was during this period that
in d ep en d e n t publications and
broadcast program s em erged. Like
political liberalization, econom ic
developm ent may have been a nec
essary background condition for
m edia opening, b u t it did not lead
autom atically o r im m ediately to
changes in the M exican press.

A third potential explanation for
the rise o f in d ep en d e n t m edia in
Mexico is the developm ent and
spread o f new com m unication tech
nologies. Ever since the printing
press curtailed the power o f the
pulpit in medieval Europe,
technophiles have em phasized the
liberating im pact of innovation on
mass com m unications. Today,
direct broadcasting from satellites,
the In te rn e t and a host o f equally
rem arkable inventions threatens to
u n d erm in e governm ent attem pts at
censorship. In theory, these inno
vations in com m unication m ight
have allowed in d ep en d e n t m edia to
em erge and flourish. Yet, while
technological change has u n d o u b t
edly had a powerful effect in cer
tain settings, it has played only a
lim ited role in Mexico. T he p en e
tration o f advanced com m unication
technologies rem ains quite small,
according to surveys by Nielsen and
IBOPE of Mexico. As late as 1995,
for instance, ju st 2% o f Mexican
households had a personal com put
er and only 10% were con n ected to
a pay-television system. Moreover,
some o f the allegedly liberating
technologies— cable television, for
exam ple—have long been con
trolled by Televisa an d o th er en ter
prises aligned with the PRI.
Changes in the Mexican m edia
were m ore likely to be the result of
increased com petition from tradi
tional outlets, such as broadcasting
and p rin t m edia.
This brings us to a fo u rth possible
explanation for increased in d ep en 
dence in the Mexican media: eco
nom ic liberalization and m arket
com petition. This theory argues
that m arket-friendly reform s in
tightly controlled econom ies can
Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two
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underm ine governm ent control and
allow ind ep en d en t m edia to flourish.
As Mexican journalist Raymundo
Riva Palacio told Business Week in
1993, “Economic reform in an
authoritarian state like Mexico weak
ens the system and opens up oppor
tunities for o th er sources of power.”
In o th er words, recent Mexican pres
idents may n o t have prom oted
m edia freedom directly, but they
supported it indirectly by imple
m enting m arket-oriented reforms.
A substantial am ount of evidence
supports this argum ent as it applies
to the Mexican media. Independent
newspapers proved they could suc
cessfully com pete for readers and
advertisers. T heir financial autono
my in tu rn gave them the ability to
resist official pressures and blandish
ments. In radio, the trem endous
success o f feisty talk shows in the
early 1990s encouraged other sta
tions hungry for advertising rev
enues to experim ent with m ore inde
pen d en t coverage. Finally, com m er
cial com petition following the priva
tization o f government-owned televi
sion channels in 1992-1993 put pres
sure on the country’s dom inant net
work, Televisa, to introduce a mea
sure of independence in news
reporting. The effects of com m er
cial com petition were reinforced by
economic crisis, which spurred
Televisa to search out novel strate
gies to protect its ratings.
We thus have the makings of a tidy
explanation for the transform ation
of M exico’s media. Political liberal
ization—while partial and tenta
tive—ruled out the sustained system
atic assault on M exico’s press.
Meanwhile, changes in Mexican
audiences b ro ught on by economic
developm ent helped create a m arket
for ind ep en d en t journalism . Finally,
the introduction of m arket-oriented
reform s rewarded independentm inded m edia and encouraged oth
ers to adopt new styles of coverage.
While com pelling as far as it goes,
this story is unnervingly agent-less.
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It explains why independent-m inded
journalists who experim ented with
new styles of reporting were m ore
likely to be successful in the 1980s
and 1990s than in earlier eras. It
also explains why their experim ents
tended to be contagious. But it does
not explain why they were motivated
to experim ent in the first place, nor
why many of them persisted in doing
so despite impressive obstacles
(including occasional episodes of
official repression).
The answer to this question lies in
the developm ent of a new journalis
tic culture in segments o f the
Mexican press. M exico’s em erging
fourth estate was no t simply the
product o f structural opportunities;
it was the product of im agination,
learning and struggle by particular
journalists and clusters of journalists
whose vision led them to reject the
old ways o f doing business in favor of
a new style of reporting. Collectively,
they converted the opportunities
provided by political liberalization,
socioeconomic developm ent and
m arket-oriented reform into practi
cal realities.
The role of journalistic profession
alism was especially crucial for
Mexico’s independent publications,
including such titles as Proceso, La
Jornada, El Financiero, Reforma, Zeta
and Publico. Each o f these periodi
cals was created with the conscious
goal of avoiding the traditional
foibles of Mexican journalism ,
including corruption and collusion
with the political establishment.
Many were founded or invigorated
by individuals whose previous
encounters with officialdom had
reinforced their own self-image as
independent journalists. W ithout
reference to this broad process of
professionalization, it is simply
impossible to explain where and
when independent m edia em erged.
T h e Im po r tan c e

of

A gency

These findings suggest that the
em ergence of a fourth estate is not

the mechanical result of political or
econom ic changes. Rather, it
depends on the efforts of a new
cadre of journalists, their own inter
nal process of identity form ation,
and the contagion effect they ulti
mately have on other media. It is
this change inside the press, as much
as changes in the external environ
m ent, that explains m edia opening
in Mexico.
Interestingly, recent studies o f the
m edia in other countries seem to
point in the same direction. One
example comes from Silvio
W aisbord’s research on the press
and political scandal in Argentina.
Waisbord argues that journalists’
own sense of mission was a decisive
factor in determ ining which media
rem ained independent in the face of
m ounting pressure from the govern
m ent of President Carlos Menem.
O f particular im portance was the
em ergence of Pagina 12 newspaper,
whose staff retained a unique profes
sional self-image and ideology that
fortified the p ap e r’s in d ependent
stance. Although factors like m arket
com petition may have encouraged
larger m edia consortia to cover
touchy stories after they broke, it was
often Pagina 12 that m ade sure they
were reported in the first place.
If these argum ents are correct,
they suggest a new approach to the
study of press freedom . This
approach would not deny the im por
tance o f certain background condi
tions, including the political and
econom ic realities of each country.
It would, however, focus on the m oti
vations, decisions and actions of
journalists themselves, as well as on
the training and experiences that
shaped their behavior. In other
words, it would assume that a free
press does not appear automatically
in the wake of political liberalization,
economic developm ent, technologi
cal innovation or m arket-oriented
reform. It m ust be built by commit
ted journalists willing to risk censure
or repression. ■
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La Polftica del Palo
Silvio Waisbord

n January 25, 1997,
the charred body of
news photographer
Jose Luis Cabezas was
found inside a b u rn t
car in Pinamar, a
fashionable Argentine resort town.
The m urder sent a chill down the
spine of Argentines, for it resembled
the infamous m ethods of the death
squads that roam ed the country
when the juntas ruled and rekindled
mem ories of the “dirty war” waged by
the last military dictatorship.
Cabezas had been kidnapped, hand
cuffed, tortured, shot point-blank
and set afire inside the vehicle. The
corpse was unrecognizable; investiga
tors used Cabezas’s car keys, watch
and dental records to identify it.
The event becam e a symbol of vio
lence against the press and a rallying
cry for journalists in Latin America.
Demonstrations were organized to
petition the governm ent to investi
gate and prosecute the individuals
responsible for the murder.
Cabezas’s picture and the slogan
“D on’t Forget Cabezas” became ubiq
uitous on billboards and signs in
public buildings and newsrooms.
Although almost 900 physical or ver
bal attacks against journalists were
recorded in Argentina between 1989
and 1997, this case crossed the line
of the limits of expected violence.
The savagery of Cabezas’s execution
ers not only was a rem inder of the
worst years of state-sponsored vio
lence, but also jettisoned the convic
tion that the killing of journalists
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Violence against the press in Latin America

ended with the collapse o f the
authoritarian regime in Argentina,
u n d er whose rule nearly 100 jo u rn al
ists were reported m urdered or dis
appeared.
The Cabezas m urder is one of the
latest examples of the persistence of
anti-press violence in Latin America.
T he shift from authoritarianism to
democracy has neither pu t an end to
violence against journalists nor
brought justice for its victims. O ut of
27 reporters killed worldwide in
1997, 10 were in Latin America,
including four in Colombia, three in
Mexico, and one each in Argentina,
Brazil and Guatemala. D uring the
last decade, scores of journalists have
been intim idated and assaulted, and
122 have been m urdered or "disap
peared." Domestic and international
organizations have mobilized to peti
tion full investigations, and the
Organization of American States
(OAS) created the office of the press
rapporteur to report abuses. Yet, the
perpetrators of anti-press violence
have rarely been prosecuted. As in
the Cabezas case, judicial investiga
tions lag and becom e trapped in a
web of political interests.
W hat drives anti-press violence in
Latin America, and what does it say
about the cu rren t state of freedom
of expression in the region? Is the
problem related to the difficulty of
guaranteeing respect for hum an
rights? O r is it a manifestation of
larger dynamics of political violence
that underlie the region’s political
history?
A n t i -P r e ss V io l e n c e

and

P o l it ic a l

V io l e n c e

Anti-press violence is, arguably,
merely another m anifestation of the
widespread violence that has long

plagued Latin America. In a region
dom inated by violent politics, it
would be surprising if the press were
not a target of attacks. It is no coin
cidence, then, that there have been
m ore lethal attacks againstjournalists in countries where historical lev
els of violence continue unabated.
According to the records of interna
tional and domestic organizations,
the situation in Colombia,
Guatemala, Mexico and P eru is sig
nificantly worse than anywhere else
in the region. A death toll of 153
journalists between 1978 and 1997
has m ade Colombia in particular
one of the m ost dangerous countries
for journalists in the world, although
the situation has im proved somewhat
in the 1990s: 18 journalists were
killed in 1986 during the heyday of
the Medellin cartel-related violence,
com pared to five in 1997. Also in
the 1990s, 15 m urders o f journalists
have been docum ented in Mexico
and 20 in Peru.
In these countries, anti-press vio
lence does not seem to be isolated
from broader political conditions.
Violence has characterized
Colombian politics for m uch of the
country’s m odern history.
Guatemala, too, is still reeling in the
afterm ath of 56 years o f civil war. In
Mexico, drug-related violence has
become commonplace, especially in
the n o rth ern states. P eru is grap
pling with the rem nants of violent
guerrilla movements and the legacy
of the 1992 coup, which gave carte
blanche to military and intelligence
services.
Anti-press violence is linked to the
crisis of the state; that is, the inability
to monopolize the legitimate means
of violence and m onitor respect for
the rule of law. The existence of

areas subjected to the rule of drug
barons, param ilitary squads and
guerrilla movements attests to the
breakdown of state authority.
Although any generalization would
miss the nuances of each case,
attacks against journalists need to be
understood as an expression of a sit
uation of "uncivil" war: localized, dis
persed and unstructured violence
that lacks the characteristics of for
mal civil wars. This type of crisis
varies across and within countries,
but it is glaringly evident in countries
where anti-press violence is recur
rent.
The weight of the drug economy
has exacerbated the situation. Often
in complicity with local and national
authorities, druglords hold absolute
control over determ ined geographi
cal zones in Latin America. Any
journalist reporting on drug issues
faces not only the prospect of anger
ing narcotraficantes with no patience
for democratic debate, but also the
passivity of official authorities. The
problem is com plicated fu rth er by
the military and param ilitary squads
created to com bat drug trafficking
or guerrilla insurrection. Such
groups enjoy a great deal of autono
my and, if accountable at all, answer
only to military authorities. The
com bination of powerful druglords
and corrupt official forces, especially
in regions dom inated by guerrilla
movements in the last decade, has
been lethal for journalists. A com
plex web of interests, including
druglords, local bosses, police, mili
tary forces and guerrillas, is con
firm ed or suspected behind dozens
of attacks against reporters.
These problem s characterize the
interior of countries especially.
Although urban areas are certainly
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n o t exempt, the provincial press has
been m ore prone to fatal attacks
than the m etropolitan press in Latin
America. In the last decade, 75% of
the m urders and disappearances of
journalists in the region occurred in
provincial areas. Between 1986 and
1996, one out of a total of 10 jo u r
nalists killed in Mexico was m ur
d ered in the country’s capital.
Similarly, journalists reporting for
news organizations in Brasilia, Rio de
Janeiro and Sao Paulo have rarely
been the targets of violence; most
attacks have been directed against
their colleagues in the Brazilian inte
rior. In Paraguay, too, journalists
working in border towns have suf
fered m ore intim idation and physical
attacks than their counterparts in
Asuncion.
When the state fails to exercise full
sovereignty and the rule of law is
weak, journalists, like other citizens,
confront a dangerous situation.
Unlike regular citizens, however,
journalists—especially those affiliat
ed with major news organizations in
m etropolitan areas—are in a posi
tion to attract wide publicity. Large
m edia organizations as well as
national and international organiza
tions offer "deterrence by publicity,"
although this does not guarantee
invulnerability—the frequent harass
m ent of journalists in m etropolitan
areas, including assassinations in
broad daylight, is evidence enough.
Journalists removed from the lime
light of the big m edia are even less
protected. Lacking the visibility and
prom inence of m etropolitan news
m edia or effective checks on local
powers, regional reporters are vul
nerable to police brutality or para
military repression.
The ineffectiveness o f the judicial
system exacerbates the situation of
lawlessness in m uch of Latin
America. Perpetrators are rarely cap
tured, and when they are, cases are
often shelved and forgotten; for
example, perpetrators were identi
fied and apprehended in only six out
32 Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two

o f 108 m urders of Colombian jo u r
nalists between 1977 and 1995. The
problem is not so m uch an absence
of legislation, but a lack of enforce
ment. This shortcom ing is not
unique to violence against the press;
it represents the larger difficulties of
institutionalizing the rule of law and
elim inating im punity in the region.
V io len c e

and a

N ew J o u r n a l is t ic

S p ir it

Anti-press violence is not indis
criminate. It is not "the press" as a
whole that suffers violence, bu t indi
vidual reporters and news organiza
tions. In the past, harassm ent of
reporters was linked to partisan and
ideological confrontations. Today’s
attacks show a different pattern,
reflecting the rise of news organiza
tions that dare to take jabs at govern
m ent officials and examine the activi
ties of param ilitary organizations and
drug-trafficking organizations. The
majority of the victims are reporters
who cover controversial and sensitive
issues, such as corruption, narcotics
trafficking and hum an rights abuses.
In Mexico, the targets include publi
cations that investigate the linkages
between drug barons and local
police and judges, such as Tijuanabased Zeta. Reporters who write
about police corruption, including
journalists from TV Azteca, Reforma
and El Universal, are also attacked.
In Peru, the newsweekly Caretas and
the daily La Republica, as well as print
and broadcast investigative reporters,
are intim idated by military and intel
ligence services. In an episode that
had national and international
repercussions, the staff and owner of
the television station Frecuencia
Latina had to leave the country in
the afterm ath of reports that
denounced military abuses, corrup
tion and illegal governm ent wiretap
ping.
In countries that lack a legacy of
respect for basic dem ocratic rights,
the belief persists am ong some pow
erful actors that critical reporting is a

nuisance that can and m ust be elimi
nated. Despite the evident improve
m ent of general press freedom s since
the return of democratic rule to
Latin America, the ambiguous atti
tude of governments in the region
toward the press implicitly sends the
message that violence against jo u r
nalists will not be punished. Legal
attem pts to muffle press criticism
reinforce the sense that an adversari
al press cannot be tolerated.
In Argentina, the governm ent’s
tirades against journalists ru n
counter to the official rhetoric that a
critical press is a welcome develop
m ent for a democratic order. W hen
a reporter investigating connections
between political mafias and prom i
n en t politicians was beaten recently,
President Carlos Saul M enem matterof-factly observed that such attacks
were "occupational hazards." After
an expose about the construction of
a new airport runway in his hom e
town, M enem lashed back, stating
that the report was produced by "stu
pid, lying and despicable [journal
ists] paid by the opposition." During
a press briefing for foreign corre
spondents in Ju n e 1997, he
described Horacio Verbitsky, an
influential columnist for the daily
Pagina/12, as “one of the biggest ter
rorists in Argentina.” Later the same
year, Menem endorsed the ley del
polo, paraphrasing Benjamin
Franklin on m aking “the liberty of
the cudgel” a condition of freedom
of the press. Franklin jo k ed that this
law would make it permissible for
writers who attacked individual repu
tations to be waylaid and beaten, and
for reporters who affronted the pub
lic to be tarred and feathered. The
ironic tone of Franklin’s com m ents
did no t translate well in a country
still reeling from the brutal assassina
tion of Cabezas. Finally, in the afterm ath of press revelations about gov
ernm ent corruption, the M enem
adm inistration subm itted a proposal
to Congress that included prison sen
tences and hefty fines for “insults”

Features: Anti-Press Violence

and libel. The recom m ended pun
ishments were harsher than those
prescribed for torture. Menem
rescinded the “gag law” proposal
only after domestic and internation
al observers protested.
Elsewhere in Latin America, the
legal situation is not m uch better.
T he Peruvian press continues to be
subjected to antiterrorist laws enact
ed after the 1992 coup. In Mexico,
the Zedillo adm inistration presented
an official proposal to Congress that
included fines of up to $100,000 for
defam ation and unlim ited am ounts
in damages against m edia owners.
Seventy-four cases have been filed so
far.
W h y D o e s A n t i -P r e ss V io l e n c e
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Real World Experience
and Theory
• M ultidisciplinary teaching approach
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• M ulticultural student mix
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Graduate Programs

M atter?

A dem ocratic press is contingent
on the strengthening of civil society
and the observance of fundam ental
constitutional liberties. In Latin
America, the difficulty is not only
the establishm ent o f a press
autonom ous from the state bu t also
the existence o f societies decim ated
by uncivil, violent practices. Anti
press violence magnifies the fragility
of dem ocratic institutions in coun
tries still experiencing internal wars
and whose governm ents are inca
pable of protecting basic rights.
Latin America bears a legacy o f vio
lence inherited from dictatorial peri
ods. The region continues to suffer
from the discretionary use o f state
force and crim inal organizations
that escape any m eans of dem ocratic
control. The equivocal attitude of
elected officials toward the protec
tion of press rights contributes fur
th er to create an atm osphere of vio
lence. Prospects for affirm ing a
dem ocratic press are seriously con
strained when civil society, ideally a
realm o f pluralism and tolerance of
dissent, is shredded into islands of
civility. Beyond those islands the
press, if critical o f local and national
powers, faces the violence o f decid
edly uncivil wars. ■

• Spanish Language Journalism
• Student Media Advising
• Integrated Communications:
Advertising and Public Relations
Get to the top of the fastest growing seg
m en t o f news m edia— the H ispanic
media. Study journalism in Spanish in
Miami at one of A m erica’s m ost dynam
ic and m ulticultural universities. O ur
Spanish-language M aster of Science
degree in Mass Com m unication special
izes in investigative journalism and is
taught entirely in Spanish.

F l o r id a I n t e r n a t io n a l U n iv e r s it y

School of Journalism
and Mass Com m unication
N orth Campus
N orth Miami, Florida 33181
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Gone to Rust
Photos by Patricio Ctvoker Text by Alisa Newman

S

ed” to m ore productive sectors.
ince Bolivia first entered
More than 20,000 miners lost their
the global economy during
jobs, and once-thriving m ining cen
the period of Spanish colo
nial rule, its role has been
ters became ghost towns. Tent cities
that of mineral exporter.
sprang up on the outskirts of La Paz
The legendary mines of
and Cochabamba as unemployed
Potosf and other rich silver veins inminers m igrated to urban centers in
search of work.
Alto Peru, as Bolivia was then known,
financed the Spanish empire
Today, the mines and the towns
throughout much of the colonial
built around them languish in desola
period. In the twentieth century,
tion. Theaters that once prem iered
Bolivia’s mines again pulled the
new shows are boarded up. Carts
country into the world economy, this
that carried ore out of the mines rust
time with exports of tin. Bolivia
in their tracks. Incongruous rem 
became the world’s leading tin pro
nants of the good life, like the golf
ducer, feeding industrial dem and for
club in the deserted m ining town of
canning and other uses.
Catavi, are painful reminders that the
Eventually, however, the tin mines
wealth of the past is the poverty of
were depleted or rendered obsolete
the present.
Little by little, some of the form er
by new metal alloys and synthetic
m
ining
towns have begun to revive.
materials. By 1980, Bolivia’s export
Taking
advantage
of good transporta
commodities had diversified to
include natural gas and agricultural
tion routes, necessary at one time to
products, with tin representing only
get the minerals to market, the city of
about one-quarter of the value of
O ruro has reinvented itself as a thriv
total exports. The price of tin was
ing center of contraband. In
$5.72 per pound in 1978; by 1985, it
Llallagua, form er miners have
had fallen by m ore than half, to
$2.50. Miners who already suffered
notorious working conditions and
poor health clung to the jobs that
were the only source of their survival.
In 1985, President Victor Paz
Estenssoro, who had nationalized the
country’s mines after the 1952
Bolivian Revolution, enacted a
decree that shut many of them down.
Instead of acknowledging the dis
missals, the governm ent claimed that
workers were merely being “relocat-

Patricio Crooker is a photojournalist
based in Bolivia. Some of the following
images appeared in the Bolivian newspa
per La Razon in June 1999 as part of a
special feature on former mining towns.
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become taxi drivers, bricklayers and
locksmiths. Young people fill the
main plaza, and four separate bus
companies serve neighboring cities.
A university and television station are
proof that the town is beginning to
recover culturally and psychologically,
as well. In other areas, zinc and ore
have replaced silver and tin as prof
itable minerals to mine. Many form er
mining centers, however—Corocoro
and Catavi am ong them —appear to
be slipping irretrievably into oblivion.
In her 1979 study of workers in
Bolivia’s tin mines, We Eat the Mines
and the Mines Eat Us, anthropologist
June Nash quoted one m iner as say
ing to another, ‘You are like a piece
of ore; you are a part of the m ine.”
This statem ent reflects the degree to
which the lives of Bolivia’s miners
were linked to the mines they
worked, and the traum a posed by
“relocation.” At the same time, it
captures the m iners’ resiliency and
ability to endure seemingly unending
hardship. ■
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The decline of Bolivia’s mining towns

A miner pushes a cart at the opening of the Siglo XX mine. Some miners continue to hang on, working under
extremely poor conditions to salvage leftover minerals.

Opposite: Siglo XX, near the town of Llallagua in the northern part of Potosi, is one of the oldest mines in
Bolivia. This photo shows what used to be an important facility in a state of near collapse. After the govemment o f Victor Paz Estenssoro issued decree 21060 in 1985, thousands o f miners lost their jobs and moved
to the cities in search o f work.
Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two
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A building serving as headquarters fo r a cooperativa, or labor cooperative. After the economic reforms o f
the mid 1980s, many miners who lost their jobs organized into such cooperatives to work the mines'leavings.
Many work 12 hours a day, squeezing what they can from the rubble. Lacking in technology and capital,
they resort to grinding the rocks by hand.
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Photo Essay: Bolivian Mines

The hands o f this palliri— a worker who tries to salvage the last bits o f mineral from rocks extracted from the
mine— reflect the long hours she has toiled for meager reward. This picture was taken near the river in the
town ofHuanuni, once an important mine oumed by tin baron Simon I. Patino. Now it is oumed by Comibol,
the state mining company, and employs only 300 mitiers. This woman and others like her earn approximately
$4 for a 12-hour day.
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This miner, in charge o f draining water from the mine, is one of the 300 workers who kept their jobs in
Huanuni. Without proper drainage, the tunnels could flood, trapping the miners inside.
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Photo Essay: Bolivian Mines

Two kilometers in and 200 meters down, breathing becomes difficult. A miner fortifies himself against the
darkness with coca leaves and a cigarette.
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Photo Essay: Bolivian Mines

Two Bolivian soldiers nod off during their 12-hour shift inside the Huanuni mine. Comibol pays the Army to
guard the remaining minerals from pilferers. The soldiers share the same miserable working conditions as the
miners themselves.
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Photo Essay: Bolivian Mines

An elderly woman walks down the mam street o f Com com, Bolivia’s most important copper mine at the begin
ning of the century. Today the mayor’s pickup truck and one military vehicle are the only cars on the town’s
empty streets. Comcom’s young people leave for the cities as soon as they can; only the elderly stay behind.
Many homes that were boarded up during the mining exodus of the mid-1980s remain abandoned.
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Photo Essay: Bolivian Mines

Statues honoring miners in Llallagua. The statue on the left represents Federico Escobar Zapata, who died
fighting fo r a better life fo r miners. The one on the right is dedicated to all those who gave their lives in the
mines.
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Photo Essay: Bolivian Mines

The abandoned dub house of the Catavi G olf Club near Llallagua in northern Potosi. During the mining
boom years, the mining towns were the center of Bolivia’s economic and cultural life. New plays and films
premiered there, and the best soccer teams visited fo r tournaments. The Catavi golf course is now a wheat
field.

Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two

Photo Essay: Bolivian Mines

The Teatro 31 de Octubre in Llallagua used to be one o f the first stops on the touring schedules o f new plays.
The town no longer has enough people to keep it open, and the theater’s fagade has fallen into disrepair.
C a ta v i’s theater has met the same fate.
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Photo Essay: Bolivian Mines

A dilapidated Comibol station wagon parked in front o f an abandoned building in the mining town of Catavi.
The scene captures the desolation o f most mining towns in Bolivia today.
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Desperate Measures, Layered Truths
Kathleen M artin

A

utobiographical
accounts such as
R igoberta M enchu’s
Crossing Borders have a
wide readership,
w hether because of
the fame o f the subject, the com 
pelling n atu re o f the story or the
eloquence with which the protago
nist’s account is told. T he very best
autobiographical literature, of
course, em bodies all of these ele
ments. Rigoberta M enchu’s first
book, I,...Rigoberta Menchu, written
before the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize
w inner becam e an internationally
known figure, achieved its fame
based on its stunning first-person
account o f the poverty, violence and
racism experienced by the indige
Crossing Borders
nous peoples o f Guatemala. H er
second book is unlikely to stir the
by Rigoberta M enchu
controversy g enerated by h er first
Translated and edited by Ann Wright
and is, unfortunately, disappointing.
London and New York: Verso, 1998.
Crossing Borders is n o t a com pelling
242 pages.
story, n o r is it com pellingly told.
Only the fact that a Nobel laureate
a child. Political harassm ent contin
is telling it provokes interest.
ued to plague her, reaching into h er
Crossing Borders, published in
innerm ost family life. Yet, despite
1998, is a continuance of Rigoberta
these significant events, Crossing
M enchu’s life story, covering the 15
Borders has none of the immediacy
years intervening since I,... Rigoberta
of I,...Rigoberta Menchu. It fails to
Menchu was first published in 1983.
provide the sort o f personal reflec
D uring this period, the au th o r went
into exile in Mexico and reached
tion that would allow readers to
the high p o in t o f h er career as an
understand the thinking of this cen
activist by w inning the Nobel Peace
tu ry ’s m ost im portant indigenous
leader.
Prize. She got m arried an d adopted
M enchu writes straightforwardly,
bu t w ithout the depth one would
Kathleen R Martin is a professor in the
expect from som eone with h er
Department of Sociology and
accom plishm ents and life experi
Anthropology at Florida International
ences. She is m ost insightful when
describing the complexities o f fame,
University. Her research includes a book
but less so when discussing other,
about the Yucatec Maya poet and politi
m ore abstract issues. For example,
cian Araceli Cab Cumi, including a
translation of her works.
the concept o f “crossing borders”—
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Rigoberta Menchu and the Story of
All Poor Guatemalans
by David Stoll
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999.
336 pages.

moving across cultural, political and
national frontiers— promises to be a
useful framework for M enchu’s dis
cussion o f h er life as an in tern atio n 
al activist. Yet, in Crossing Borders
the concept seems to be taken quite
literally, as the au th o r describes sev
eral incidents in which she experi
enced difficulties crossing in tern a
tional boundaries. In these pas
sages, as in others, M enchu presents
herself as a victim—an inappropri
ate stance for som eone o f h er inter
national stature and political im por
tance.
Crossing Borders is a potentially sig
nificant book, because it gives the
au th o r a chance to tell h er story
directly. In contrast, I,...Rigoberta
Menchu was an “as-told-to” testim oni

F

al in which Venezuelan anthropolo
gist Elizabeth Burgos interviewed
M enchu and edited the resulting
text. Crossing Borders may be m ore
authentic, but it is n o t necessarily a
m ore analytical, accessible or con
textually richer account. While the
au th o r’s own limitations as a selfreflective writer restrict the book’s
usefulness, the life story o f the
w orld’s leading spokeswoman for
indigenous peoples deserves a
m uch m ore careful presentation
than it gets here. Perhaps
M enchu’s advisors, and certainly
h er editors, are at fault for doing
h er a disservice in the production of
this book.
Crossing Borders was first published
in Spanish as Rigoberta: La nieta de
los mayas. The English and the
Spanish versions are quite different;
the latter is m ore than 100 pages
longer, and is undeniably better.
Absent from Crossing Borders are
prefaces by the Uruguayan writer
Eduardo Galeano (who recently
won the L annan F o undation’s
Cultural Freedom Award) and the
head of the Spanish section of
Amnesty International, Esteban
Beltran. Also om itted are a pro
logue by Italian writer Gianni Mina
and an especially lyrical introduc
tion by Maya Q uiche poet
H um berto Ak’abal. T he essays by
these writers provide a rich context
for M enchu’s story. T he Spanish
version includes the au th o r’s own
acknowledgm ents and the text of
the G uatem alan peace accords—
both im p o rtan t in understanding
h er story—as well as 16 pages of
photographs that visually enrich the
text. A random line-by-line com par
ison between the two versions
revealed o th er sections that appear
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in the Spanish edition bu t not in
the English one. T he Spanish ver
sion gives p ro p er credit to Dante
Liano and Gianni M ina for their
assistance in producing the book,
while the English version does not.
Crossing Borders, however, contains a
glossary, an index, a no t very useful
m ap and a list o f M enchu’s family
not present in the Spanish edition.
Crossing Borders could have used
some careful editing to make it
m ore accessible to readers or simply
to improve the text. Since the book
was intended to chronicle M enchu’s
life over the past 15 years, present
ing h er story in chronological order
would seem to be an obvious deci
sion. Unfortunately, the account
skips back and forth through time,
m aking it difficult for anyone unfa
m iliar with M enchu’s history to
keep track o f events.
Thoughtful editing could have
im proved Crossing Borders in other
ways as well. A sensitive editor
could perhaps have persuaded the
au th o r to delete some of h er m ore
peevish com m ents, unworthy of a
Nobel laureate. M enchu is prone to
blam e others for failings that she
herself shares. She criticizes the
personal appearance of groups and
individuals—Latinas, fellow
Guatemalans, even some of h er
Native Am erican supporters—yet
bristles at com m ents about h er own
looks. Likewise, she condem ns fel
low Guatem alans for leaving their
country to mobilize from abroad,
although she herself spent years liv
ing in exile in Mexico. M enchu also
takes anthropologists to task for
their parasitic relationship with
indigenous peoples, but ignores
examples of anthropologists who act
on behalf o f the com m unities they

M

study—to take bu t one example,
Myrna Mack Chang, who was
stabbed to death because of her
reports about the state-sponsored
violence in Guatemala.
T he editors o f Crossing Borders
have produced a substandard
account o f M enchu’s story and
should be held answerable for their
omissions and inattentive editing.
Those interested in the Nobel laure
a te ’s story would do better to read
the Spanish-language original.
Despite the flaws o f Crossing
Borders, it is M enchu’s first book that
lies at the center of the cu rren t con
troversy surrounding her. This con
troversy erupted as the result o f the
1999 book Rigoberta Menchu and the
Story of AU Poor Guatemalans, by
N orth Am erican anthropologist
David Stoll. T hrough long and
careful research, Stoll refutes signifi
cant portions of the Nobel laure
ate’s story as rep o rted in
I,...Rigoberta Menchu. T he resulting
u p ro ar has stirred debate in the
press, especially in Guatem ala and
the U nited States.
Fifteen years ago a young (23-yearold) , politically com m itted
R igoberta M enchu told an allegedly
first-person account of h er suffer
ings as an indigenous woman in an
oppressive G uatem alan society.
Elizabeth Burgos, the an th ro p o lo 
gist who recorded M enchu’s story,
originally in tended it as a m agazine
article; she later decided that she
had enough m aterial for a book.
First published in Spanish,
/,.. .Rigoberta Menchu went on to
becom e an international bestseller.
It has been translated into a dozen
languages and added to required
reading lists in many universities. It
is unlikely that anyone involved in
Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two
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the first interview with M enchu
th o u gh t th at eith er she or the book
would go on to achieve such fame,
or that at some later time the accu
racy of h er account would be sub
je c t to the close scrutiny it has
received. T he goal of recording h er
story was to draw public attention to
the genocidal war being waged
against the indigenous peoples of
Guatemala.
Stoll suggests th at this explains
why M enchu’s account neglects to
m ention aspects o f the G uatem alan
reality, such as intra-Maya land own
ership disputes, that would cloud
the construct o f the G uatem alan
tragedy as an indigenous versus ladino conflict. H e also discovered that
some o f the b o o k ’s w renching eye
witness testimony was n o t in fact
part of M enchu’s personal experi
ence. As one G uatem alan
expressed it, “The book may n o t be
tru e about her, but it is true about
G uatem ala.” In sum, the hum an
rights agenda in Guatemala called
for desperate measures and ended
with layered truths.
Stoll did n o t start out with the
idea of writing a book to refute
M enchu’s story. But in the process
of interviewing survivors of the
political violence in G uatem ala in
the late 1980s, he began to hear
accounts th at differed, in some
instances greatly, from M enchu’s
original narrative. This led him to
conduct detailed, fact-checking
research into M enchu’s life story.
T he result is a carefully crafted
piece o f scholarly investigative work,
clearly w ritten and accessible to
readers. T he bulk of the book is in
the form of a counternarrative to
M enchu’s account in I,.. .Rigoberta
Menchu. Yet, this is no t Stoll’s most
significant contribution. The most
interesting part of his book is the
final four chapters, in which he
interprets the m eaning o f Rigoberta
M enchu as an iconic figure.
Stoll m aintains th at through the
construction o f h er narrative in
48 Hemisphere • Volume Nine, Number Two

I,...Rigoberta Menchu, the author
becam e a symbol used to prolong a
guerrilla war that the G uatem alan
left was losing and which from the
start had found questionable sup
p o rt am ong the indigenous peas
antry. F urtherm ore, he makes the
case that the N orth Am erican and
E uropean scholarly and hum an
rights com m unities used M enchu’s
account of h er life to idealize
indigenous peoples, ultimately to
serve their own m oral needs.
Uncritical acceptance of h er n arra
tive was virtually required as proof
of o n e ’s com m itm ent to the
oppressed and, for scholars especial
ly, to ease the troubling nature of
working as observers o f the lives of
the poor. For such readers, the dis
course of unequal power relations
was enough to excuse accounts such
as M enchu’s from the need for any
sort of validation.
The elaboration o f these them es
is the lasting, thought-provoking
contribution o f Stoll’s book. Some
of his ideas rem ain undeveloped,
but his provocative account has
spurred debate on several issues, in
particular the construction of

indigenous identities in the service
o f intellectual and activist com m uni
ties. Stoll’s work is p ro o f that when
scholars go against the accepted wis
dom (or political correctness) of
the day, they may inadvertently
reconstruct the paths of intellectual
inquiry.
The sad consequence of the con
troversy surrounding Rigoberta
M enchu is th at she and the cause of
the indigenous peoples she rep re
sents have been tainted in the pub
lic eye and perhaps lost credibility.
An uninform ed reading o f Stoll’s
book could lead to the simplistic
conclusion that M enchu was delib
erately u n tru th fu l in telling h er life
story, albeit in the service of a des
perately im m ediate hum an rights
cause. Hers appears to be a case of
the ends justifying the m eans— a
morally debatable proposition for
m ost readers.
Stoll has thoroughly checked
every aspect o f M enchu’s story.
O ne can only hope that those
responsible for the genocide of
G uatem ala’s indigenous peoples will
be held to the same exacting stan
dard of accountability. ■

The Sum m it of the Americas C enter (SOAC) at
Florida In te rn a tio n a l University is cu rren tly
revam ping its web site: www.americasnet.net. This
site will serve as a clearinghouse and an In tern et
portal for analytical lite ratu re related to the
Summit of the Americas process and for the nego
tiations on the Free Trade Area o f the Americas
(FTAA). AmericasNet will cover the four pillars of
hem ispheric integration that SOAC is concentrat
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Please visit us at www.americasnet.net for the most
updated inform ation and analysis of the Summit
process as we lead up to the III Sum m it o f the
Americas in Q uebec City in 2001.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY’S
INTERCULTURAL DANCE AND MUSIC INSTITUTE
presents in collaboration with the Florida Dance Association
and the Florida Dance Festival the third a nnual...

LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN

June 25 -July 1, 2000
N ew World School o f the A rts
M iam i, Florida
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NDAMI’s Latin Am erican and Caribbean Sum m er Dance
Institute offers an exciting week of intensive study opportunities
for students, artists, scholars, teachers, and others interested in
studying the dance, music, and distinctive cultural traditions of
Africa and the diaspora. Two separate and concurrent intensive
programs are com bined with dance technique classes, seminars,
panel discussions, and perform ances to offer participants the
opportunity to engage in an exciting dialogue and exchange with
artists and scholars of these culturally rich areas of the world. The
2000 Sum m er Institute unites local, national, and international
scholars, artists, students, and educators in a celebration of the
dance, music, and culture of the culturally diverse city of Miami,
helping to preserve and prom ote these distinctive traditions. This
year’s program will feature Chuck Davis and the African American
Dance Ensemble and Raimundo “Mestre King” Santos from
Salvador, Brazil. Highlights of the Summ er Dance Institute include
technique classes in Haitian, Afro-Cuban, Afro-Brazilian, capoeira,
Caribbean, and West African dance and drum m ing with renowned
teachers and artists; interdisciplinary, team -taught academic intensives in “Dance and Culture of Africa and the Diaspora” and
“Cultural Expressions o f Latin America and the Caribbean;” panel
discussions with distinguished scholars in the field; a pre-perfor
m ance processional and libation cerem ony down Miami Beach’s
famous Lincoln Road and a concert at the Colony T heater by
Chuck Davis and the African American Dance Ensemble; and an
inform al dance and drum m ing jam with Institute master teachers
and musicians.

The Summer Dance Institute
is co-sponsored by FIU’s
Department of Theatre and
Dance, African/New World
Studies Program and
Latin American and
Caribbean Center
For fu rth er information

For detailed information regard
ing college and in-service credit,
or more information on INDAMI
and other FIU programs,
please contact:
INDAMI Program Coordinator
Florida International University
University Park, DM 353
Miami, Florida 33199
Tel: 305-348-2894
Fax: 305-348-3593
E-mail: indami@fiu.edu
Florida Dance Festival
505 1 7th Street
Miami Beach, Florida 33139
Tel: 305-674-3350
Fax: 305-674-3354
E-mail: fldance@fldance. org
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LATIN AMERICA.

No other airline in the world offers more travel options to Latin Am erica than we do. Now with
over 100 flights every business da y to 33 cities in 18 countries throughout Mexico, Central a n d
South America. From six m ajor U.S. cities. A s always, ^ A d v a n ta g e ® travel a w a rd s p rogram

m em bers ca n ea rn m ileage credit every tim e they fly . So whether y o u ’reflying to Latin America fo r business
or pleasure, fly the airline that’s leading the way. For details, call yo u r Travel Agent or American at 1-800-433-7300
or visit us on the web at www.aa.com Consulte a su agente de viajes
o llam e gratis a A m erican A irlines al 1-800-633-3711 en espanol.
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•
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COLOMBIA
P A N A M A

•

Something special to Latin A m erica’

COSTA

• P A R A G U A Y
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•

PERU

•

ECUADOR
•

U R U G U A Y

•

EL
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SALVADOR

V E N E Z U E L A

American Airlines and AAdvantage are registered trademarks o f American Airlines, Inc. American Airlines reserves the right to change AAdvantage program rules, regulations, travel awards
and special offers at any time without notice, and to end the AAdvantage program with six months notice. AAdvantage travel awards, mileage accrual and special offers are subject
to government regulations. American Airlines is not responsible fo r products or services offered by other participating companies. Schedules subject to change without notice.

